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"Updating" the Communications
Act: New Electronics, Old
Economics, and the Demise of the
Public Interest
By PETER J. KOKALIS*
I.
Introduction
The American communications industry' has existed for most of
its commercial life in an environment of government regulation.
The 1980's have seen increasing hostility to such regulation, and
the communications industry has proven to be a prime target for
relaxation or removal of regulations perceived increasingly as
harmful or ineffective.3
Advocates of deregulation" point to the virtual revolution in
* Member, Third Year Class. The author wishes to thank Professor Jules Dundes, Direc-
tor, Mass Media Institute, Stanford University, for his valuable assistance in the prepara-
tion of this note.
1. The Communications industry includes both "telecommunications" and broadcasting.
"Telecommunications" is telephone and data transmission. It is the subject of part III of
this note. Broadcast communications is the subject of parts IV and V. The focus here is
upon federal regulation only; state regulation is treated only where it might possibly be pre-
empted by federal legislation.
2. The Carter Administration began deregulatory efforts in areas such as airlines and
trucking, and actively supported the general thrust of the communications deregulation ef-
fort, through the Commerce Department. See Hearings on H.R. 3333 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House
of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), Serial No. 96-124 (hereafter cited as Hear-
ings on H.R. 3333)(statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Commerce) at 733-804.
The deregulatory views of the Reagan Administration are set out by several key Administra-
tion personnel in the pre-election work THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s (Hoover Institu-
tion 1980). See also New FCC Chief Says He'll Balance Interests of Industry with His
Free-Market Views, Wall St. J., July 6, 1981, at 17, col. 4.
3. See American Bar Association, PuLIc UTnLrrY LAW 1980 at 23-26 (1980).
4. The chief advocates of deregulation have been the leaders of the broadcast and "com-
petitive" telecommunications industries. The Bell System has opposed several specifics of
deregulation, chiefly those which would aid its competitors at its expense, but has supported
the concept of lessening government control. The Carter and Reagan Administrations have
favored deregulation. Congressional leadership in the 96th Congress was provided by Sena-
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communications technology' as a justification for the relaxation of
government controls. They note that in 19276 and 1934,' when con-
trols were first enacted, the industry was in danger of monopoliza-
tion by private firms.6 In light of today's new technologies, how-
ever, deregulation advocates suggest that this danger of
monopolization no longer, exists.' The use of modern equipment
has made competitive telephone systems and new radio and televi-
sion stations technologically feasible for the first time. A free,10
competitive" market, the argument continues, is expected to arise
and flourish, adequately meeting consumer needs without resort to
regulation.
This note suggests that in each of the communications fields
considered ripe for deregulation-telephone," radio," and televi-
sion'4 - relaxation of controls will frustrate longstanding efforts to
make communications as broadly accessible as possible. Rather,
communications opportunity will become stratified, increasingly
accessible only to the affluent, 5 the urban," and the established,"
tors Hollings, Packwood, and Goldwater, and by Congressmen Van Deerlin and Frey. Sena-
tors Packwood and Goldwater have continued deregulation efforts in the 97th Senate; Con-
gressman Wirth has held hearings on communications legislation but the orientation of his
efforts may not be deregulatory.
5. The new technologies include microwave transmission, satellite transmission, optical
fibers, cable television, microprocessors, videotape, video discs, and others. For a discussion
of new developments in the telephone industry, see Luff, The Electronic Telephone, ScIEN-
TIFIc AMERICAN, March, 1978, at 58.
6. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-
121 (1976)).
7. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
8. F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). "Congress moved (to pass
the Act of 1934) under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental
control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broad-
casting field." Id. at 137.
9. The findings of S. 2827, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(1) (1980) are illustrative: "The Con-
gress hereby finds and declares that- (1) rapid advances in telecommunications technologies
are making possible competition among providers of telecommunications services which
were previously thought to have natural monopoly characteristics .... "
10. "Free" in the sense of free entry and exit is apparently far from reality. See text
accompanying notes 86, 231, infra. Congress may, however, mean that the field is to be free
from statutory prohibitions on new radio, television, or telephone facilities.
11. The Communications Act revisions attempt to create a competitive market by remov-
ing statutory restrictions. This may not be enough. See text accompanying notes 166-74,
infra.
12. See part III, infra.
13. See parts IV and V, infra.
14. See parts IV and V, infra.
15. See parts IIIA, IV and V, infra.
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while less available to the new, the rural, the young, and the poor.
Such an outcome would be tragically ironic given the undisputed
potential of new technologies to make communications more acces-
sible than ever before.
This note's basic premise is that communications should be
viewed as a content-neutral medium, a facility to convey ideas be-
tween and among all segments of the public. The key attributes of
this medium should be unrestricted access" and freedom from dis-
tortion of intended messages.19 Governmental policy should en-
courage the industry's development along these lines; encourage-
ment along any other lines, as is contemplated by Congress, may
transgress the First Amendment."o
Deregulation, however, promotes a profoundly different course
for communications, one shaped according to marketplace rather
than communication criteria. Under a policy of deregulation, eco-
nomic forces will dictate the ease or difficulty of access and the
need to transform the merely informative into the shockingly sen-
sational. Thus a neutral medium may become a sieve, actively
favoring some ideas while filtering out others. The technological
explosion may serve to make this process even more selective.
In each of the following sections this note will examine how der-
egulation proposals recently and presently before Congress may
reshape the communications industry, promoting access for those
"successful" in economic terms while limiting access for others.
II.
Overview of the Communications Act Revisions
Regulation of the communications industry dates from passage
of the Radio Act of 19271" and its successor, the Communications
16. See part IIIB, infra.
17. See part V, infra.
18. Time, place, and manner restrictions may restrict access to communications facilities
but are concededly necessary to promote their efficient use. Examples are the rules gov-
erning broadcast frequency and power for radio and television. See part VI, infra. Access
restrictions based upon content or upon irrelevant criteria, e.g., the wealth or economic
"success" of the speaker, should be avoided at all costs.
19. This may necessitate the retention and extension of "common carrier" status for tele-
phone, data, and cable television transmission systems. See generally Wicklein, ELECTRONIC
NIGHTMARE: THE NEW COMMUNICATIONS AND FREEDOM (1981).
20. See part VI, infra.
21. See note 6, supra.
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Act of 1934.2 These acts insured that radio and television broad-
casters made orderly, efficient use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum28 and that the multitude of telephone systems nationwide
were interconnectable and compatible with one another." They in-
volved conferral of limited monopoly privileges-over territory in
the case of telephone companies, 8 and over frequencies in the case
of broadcasting." Regulations were authorized to check potential
abuses of the monopoly privileges."
The provisions of the Communications Act have been challenged
by industry, free-market, and consumer advocates" as being re-
strictive, cumbersome, and inefficient. In 1977 Congressman Lionel
Van Deerlin (D-San Diego), then Chairman of the House Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce's Subcommittee on Com-
munications, sought a "basement-to-attic revision of the 1934
(Communications) Act"" which was to encourage the industry
along competitive rather than regulated-monopoly lines. He cited
the technological revolution as necessitating the revision.30
House and Senate committees produced several pieces of pro-
posed legislation to conform the Act to their image of the commu-
nications industry." These proposals have consistently sought to
22. See note 7, supra.
23. Licensing was the primary method of control. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
25. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976): "No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the trans-
mission of energy or communications or signals by radio . . . except under and in accor-
dance with . . . a license in that behalf granted under the provisions of this Act."
27. The Federal Communications Commission was created to enforce the regulations of
the 1934 Act. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Powers of the Federal Radio Commission were trans-
ferred to the FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 604 (1976).
28. The proposed solutions differ fundamentally, however. Free-market advocates pro-
pose elimination of the Communications Act's rules; while some consumer groups also favor
this, most feel that reform rather than repeal of the regulatory structure is proper. See
Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2.
29. Van Deerlin, Introductory Remarks, 1 COMM/ENT L.J. xiii (1977).
30. Id.
31. The initial communications deregulation bill was Van Deerlin's H.R. 13015, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), which attempted a complete replacement of the Communications Act
of 1934. Van Deerlin's H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) superseded H.R. 13015, and
was also intended as a replacement Communications Act. On the Senate side, Senator Hol-
lings' S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) and Senator Goldwater's S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) proposed amendments to, rather than replacement of, the Communications Act
of 1934. Van Deerlin re-introduced the Presidential debate provision of H.R. 3333 as H.R.
6103, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (1979) when the former failed to progress-before the 1980 elec-
tion. See part VI, infra. The telephone provisions of H.R. 3333 were re-introduced as H.R.
6121, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Senators Hollings and Goldwater introduced S. 2827, 96th
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lessen or eliminate regulations rather than to cure their perceived
defects. Although some proposals pay verbal homage to the public-
interest focus of the 1934 Act," others openly declare a preference
for a competitive-market approach.8"
Although none of the proposed Communications Act revisions
was passed by the 96th Congress, the 97th quickly resumed the
task under Republican leadership. 4 As of this writing a telephone
deregulation bill, S. 898, has passed the Republican-controlled
Senate, marking the first time in the three-year deregulation effort
that a bill has secured the approval of one full body of Congress.
Deregulation remains the theme of these revision efforts; unless
market forces are deficient, competition rather than government
decisionmaking is to be the guiding principle of the communica-
tions industry."'
The revision proposals focus on four areas of Communications
Act reform, two concerning telecommunications and two regarding
broadcasting. First, revisions seek to insure that the manufacture
and marketing of telephone systems and data transmission equip-
ment become competitive rather than monopoly-dominated." Sec-
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) which parallels, combines, and modifies provisions of S. 611 and S.
622. Television and radio's three-year license terms, slated for revision in several of the
revision bills, had been under attack for ten years by industry groups. See S. 2004, 91st
Cong., lst Sess. (1971) by Senator Pastore (D-RI) which "would have assured automatic
renewal of existing (television and radio station) licenses every three years in perpetuity."
MINrZ & COHEN, AMERICA, INc. 106 (1971). See also, BROADCASTING Oct. 12, 1981, at 188.
The 97th Congress introduced S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), S. 270, 97th Cong., lst.
Sess. (1981), S. 601, 97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981), S. 821, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and S.
1629, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981). The House of Representatives, under the leadership of
Communications Subcommittee chairman Tim Wirth, will hold hearings on a bill of its own
in the fall of 1981. See BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at 52. Congressman Collins of Texas
introduced two bills, H.R. 4780, 97th Cong., let Seas. (1981) and H.R. 4781, 97th Cong., 1st
Seas. (1981).
32. See, e.g., S. 2827, supra note 31, § 201(a): "The Congress hereby finds and declares
that (1) the basic goals of the 1934 Act continue to be valid, and it is in the public interest
to continue to attain those goals . . . ." See also S. 898, § 104(a), supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., S. 622, supra note 31, § 2(a). "The Congress finds that . .. (2) marketplace
competition can be the most efficient regulator of the provision of telecommunications ser-
vices . . . ." See also S. 898, supra note 31, § 2(2).
34. Senator Goldwater's subcommittee on communications held hearings on a radio der-
egulation bill, S. 270, supra note 31, in February, 1981. See Radio Deregulation Draws Sup-
port, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 27, 1981, at 28, col. 2.; S. 898, supra note 31, was introduced
February 16, 1981, and was passed by the United States Senate on October 7, 1981.
35. Id. See also S. 1629, supra note 31; H.R. 13015, supra note 31, tit. III, pt. B, § 331.
36. H.R. 13015, supra note 31, tit. III, pt. B; H.R. 3333, supra note 31, tit. III, pt. B; S.
611, supra note 31, tit. II, pt. 1; S. 622, supra note 31, § 201; H.R. 6121, supra note 31, §
201(b); S. 2827, supra note 31, § 201(a)(10); S. 898, supra note 31, § 234.
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ond, the provision of long-distance telephone service is to be
opened up to competition, ending the virtual monopoly of the Bell
System."8 Third, broadcasting stations' licensing rules are to be
relaxed or eliminated, removing a perceived regulatory burden
from radio and television station operators.38 Finally, broadcasters'
fairness and equal-opportunity responsibilities are to be eased or
eliminated.8*
In each of these areas, this note will contrast the implicit pre-
mise of the revision proposals with the more likely outcome of der-
egulation: instead of expanded communications opportunities
through advanced technology, the result will be a stratification of
communications options into several levels of availability, lessening
rather than expanding the communications options of those disfa-
vored by the "marketplace." The rural,'40 the poor,'1 and the new
political parties," among others, stand to lose much in this
process.
Telephone equipment manufacturers may gain a competitive ad-
vantage over the Bell System by producing inferior quality mer-
chandise at reduced prices, forcing the telephone companies to
follow suit with their own products in order to remain competi-
tive.44  This reduction in quality would betray the revisions' pre-
mise of technological advancement.
High-volume long distance telephone links between major cities
provided by private suppliers (so-called "long-distance telephone
companies," "other common carriers," or "OCC's") may divert rev-
enues from the existing nationwide telephone system," raising
37. The legal authority for provision of this service is the Execunet I decision, MCI Tele-
communications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1040
(1978). The issue before Congress regards compensating payments from competitive firms to
telephone companies for the use of telephone company facilities. See H.R. 13015, supra note
31, § 334; H.R. 3333, supra note 31, § 324; S. 622, supra note 31, § 201 (citing § 225(d)(2)(D)
of the 1934 Act); S. 2827, supra note 31, § 222. S. 898, supra note 31, § 222.
38. S. 2827, supra note 31, tit. III, §§ 301-07; H.R. 13015, supra note 31, tit. IV, pt. A;
H.R. 3333, supra note 31, tit. IV, pt. A; S. 611, supra note 31, tit. III; S. 622, supra note 31,
tit. III, § 301; S. 601, supra note 31; S. 1629, supra note 31.
39. H.R. 6103, supra note 31; H.R. 13015, supra note 31, § 434(b); H.R. 3333, supra note
31, § 462(a); S. 622, supra note 31, §§ 333(a), 334; S. 2827, supra note 31, §§ 304, 307.
40. Rural users of long-distance telephone service may face higher costs; see part IIIB,
infra.
41. The less-than-affluent may face several difficulties; see parts III,.IV and V, infra.
42. New political parties may find their access to the media curtailed. See part V, infra.
43. See text accompanying note 72, infra.
44. Id.
45. See text accompanying note 122, infra.
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costs to consumers in suburban and rural areas not situated to
take advantage of the new carriers' services." Similarly, savings
made possible by new cost-cutting technological advances in voice
transmission would tend to be confined to telephone users located
within or near major cities, where investment by competitive
firms is most attractive.
Television and radio licensing deregulation may remove any
chance of effective" public input into the uses made of the public
airwaves, allowing their domination by a relatively small broad-
casting-advertising elite. Public choice of programming and oppor-
tunity for selection would be reduced rather than enhanced.
Reduction or elimination of fairness and equal opportunity obli-
gations may further entrench the major political parties by deny-
ing new rivals the media access upon which they depend to deliver
their messages."' New and minority views which are dependent
upon fairness and equal opportunity rules to ensure even minimal
inclusion in political discussion and debate will be increasingly
limited under a system of deregulation."*
That the revisions frustrate their, own goal of expanded opportu-
nity is first examined in Part III in the context of telecommunica-
tions, where relatively minor amendments to the 1934 Act are sug-
gested by the author in order to extend to consumers nationwide
the benefits of new technology.
In Part IV, broadcast station license deregulation is examined in
light of the nonexistance of the presumed competitive market-
place, the supposed substitute for station licensing.
In Part V it is argued that relaxation of equal opportunity and
fairness obligations for political candidates strikes at the heart of
the American electoral system, and that deregulation should be
conditioned upon the establishment of adequate alternative
forums.
In Part VI, constitutional challenges to broadcast regulation, as
well as the viability of governmental action limiting speech to
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Neilsen ratings and similar measurements of the total numbers of viewers or listeners
without regard to the program's utility as an informational source cannot constitute effec-
tive public input. See text accompanying notes 178, infra.
49. See part VI, infra.
50. Id.
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those successful in the communications "marketplace," are
discussed.
III.
Telephone Deregulation
A. Customer-Owned Equipment and Systems 1
Historically, the provision of telephones and related equipment
to consumers was a jealously guarded monopoly of the telephone
companies." Two American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) subdivisions, Western Electric and Bell Laboratories,
were responsible for equipment design and manufacture. Several
private manufacturers also produced telephone equipment, adher-
ing to Western Electric specifications. These manufacturers sold
their products to AT&T and other telephone companies for even-
tual rental, but not sale, to telephone consumers. Telephone com-
panies were prohibited from selling telephones directly to the pub-
lic by a 1956 consent decree to a 1949 Justice Department
antitrust action.58
Several, judicial decisions and Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) actions have, however, cut into the telephone compa-
nies' monopoly on the provision of telephones and data-transmis-
sion equipment." The FCC actions were intended to introduce
competition into what had previously been a regulated industry."
By 1968, customer-owned or leased-from-another-source equip-
ment was allowed to be connected electrically to the Bell System
network." The FCC instituted a program to establish, at the time
51. For discussion of developments in telephone technology, see SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
supra note 5.
52. New York Law School, COMPETITION Vs. REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE MASS MEDIA at
100-11. (M. Botein & S. Robb ed. 1978). There are many local telephone companies nation-
wide, each having a designated service area. Together, they exercised a virtual monopoly
over telephone service.
53. United States v. Western Electric, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1V 68,246 (D. N.J. 1956).
54. In Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (1956), a private manufacturer was
allowed to market a mouthpiece attachment to telephone handsets, which channeled a
user's voice into the mouthpiece. and not out into the room. This was the first telephone-
related piece of equipment legally supplied by anyone other than a telephone company.
55. North Carolina Utilities Commission v. F.C.C., 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied
434 U.S. 874 (1977) (North Carolina II).
56. Electrical connections of privately owned equipment to the nationwide telephone net-
work was allowed by Carterfone v. A.T. & T., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, recon. denied 14 F.C.C.2d
571 (1968), recon. 18 F.C.C.2d 871 (1969). In 1972 the FCC decided to open the terminal
equipment market to outside competition. Docket #19528, 35 F.C.C.2d 539 (1972).
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of sale, the technical compatibility of non-Bell System equipment
with the nationwide network." Although several state utilities
commissions objected, federal pre-emption of state regulations was
upheld.58 The FCC determined in an economic survey that approx-
imately twenty percent of telephone and data equipment could be
expected to be provided by competitive sources."
This erosion of the telephone companies' monopoly on telephone
equipment took place over a period of nearly thirty years. 0 The
Communications Act revision proposals aim to ratify and consoli-
date the changes into a clear, concise statutory expression that the
telecommunication equipment field is to be competitive, not mo-
nopolistic.6 ' The Bell System would be allowed to enter this field
itself, through a separate subsidiary, to compete with the "smaller"
entrants." The 1956 consent decree prohibiting sales to the public
would be legislatively repealed."
Careful weighing of advantages and drawbacks of this emerging
competition suggests neither a clear gain nor a clear loss for the
consumer. In some areas competitive manufacturers have been
quite innovative. 4 In other areas, however, the quality and dura-
bility of competitive equipment has been decidedly inferior to that
of the telephone companies," undermining the goal of improving
57. Technical compatibility (but not durability-see note 79 and accompanying text, in-
fra) of competitively-supplied equipment is maintained through an FCC equipment regis-
tration program. See the FCC's rules and regulations, 47 CFR pt. 68 (1979).
58. In the matter of Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), aff'd sub nom.,
North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S.
1207 (1976) (North Carolina I). See also North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC, 552
F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 874 (1977)(North Carolina II). State utilities
comissions feared the loss of revenues from rental of telephone terminal equipment as users
purchased competitive equipment. Since equipment was being purchased largely by busi-
ness users, comissions feared that residential rates would have to rise to compensate for
savings to business. This fear was largely dispelled by the FCC economic survey finding, 61
F.C.C.2d 766 (1976), that residential rates actually subsidized business users and not the
reverse as was often assumed. It is uncertain whether residential rates would have been
lower in the absence of competitors' price-pressure on business equipment.
59. No. 20003, 61 F.C.C.2d 766 (1976).
60. Hush-A-Phone, supra note 54, arose in 1949.
61. See, e.g., S. 622, supra note 31, §§ 2(a), 3.
62. Weekly Report, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, October 4, 1980, at 2909. See, e.g., S. 898,
supra note 31, § 227.
63. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 229.
64. The number of special features on competitive equipment is astronomical. Users have
noted that many options are available which the Bell System does not offer. However, this is
not to suggest that Bell cannot choose to provide them, or should not have been directed to
do so by appropriate regulatory bodies, state and federal.
65. This is especially in the consumer-residential market. Business equipment usually
No. 3]1 463
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telecommunications.
The classical expectation underlying deregulation in general is
that competition will encourage innovation and the emergence of
new and better designs and systems. To some extent this has oc-
curred, an example being the proliferation of telephone answering
and message systems.
A greater benefit improperly associated by some" with deregula-
tion stems from customers' ability to purchase, rather than rent,
their own telephone equipment. Consumer groups 7 noted in Con-
gressional hearings that individual customers could save hundreds
of dollars through ownership of telephone sets. 8 The Bell System
had a history of discouraging consumer ownership, but diligent
consumers could presevere."
However, the purchase option is not dependent upon a move to-
ward competition or deregulation. The Bell System was prevented
from selling telephones by the 1956 Justice Department consent
decree, and one can only speculate as to consumer savings had Bell
been required to offer a purchase option at fair prices to the pub-
lic. Consumers may fault the absence of such a purchase option for
the high cost of monthly telephone rentals; yet the addition of re-
pair costs and inconvenience to the cost of purchasing telephone
equipment outright, without the option and availability of Bell
System repair service, make ownership of telephone equipment
less than consistently attractive.7 0
An emerging difficulty with telephone equipment manufactured
for sale to consumers is the trend toward declining durability,
ironic in the light of the revisions'. assumption of "technological
progress." Equipment produced by or for the telephone companies
for rental was made to be extremely rugged and durable.7 1 Parts
fares better, dollar for dollar, considering the tax incentives available to offset higher costs.
66. Testimony of Howard J. Symons on behalf of Congress Watch, a part of the Ralph
Nader group Public Citizen. Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. I, pt. 2, at 1193.
67. Id.
68. Id. But to the extent that the rental fee subsidized other equipment or costs, a shift to
purchased equipment will necessitate rate increases on the previously-subsidized services.
The requirement of "unbundling"-separately stating-equipment rates from monthly ser-
vice charges was to prevent subsidization. See S. 898, supra note 31, § 234(b)(1).
69. Testimony of Symons, supra note 66.
70. Customers owning their own telephones and related equipment must pay for any
needed repairs, and often must wait for repair service longer than for comparable Bell Sys-
tem repair. Some consumers have experienced the problem of their supplier going out of
business, forcing them to replace their telephone equipment.
71. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, supra note 5, at 62.
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of individual telephone sets would often be salvaged and recycled
for periods of twenty years or more." It was clearly in the tele-
phone companies' interest to make their own equipment as de-
pendable as possible.
However, the incentive regarding equipment for sale to consum-
ers is exactly opposite-to cut costs and push for frequent replace-
ments of the less-dependable products. Once equipment is sold
outright the concern that it last twenty years or more is almost
nonexistant. This disincentive toward long equipment life is com-
pounded by schemes of accelerated depreciation7 2  and investment
credit73 in the Internal Revenue Code. The result is planned, and
tax-expenditure-supported, obsolescence.
Often inferior quality equipment is priced near, or only slightly
below, that made according to rugged Western Electric specifica-
tions, for which it is only an apparent substitute." Thus, consum-
ers may be misled as to the quality of their purchase, the assump-
tion being that all telephones are equally durable as was the case
prior to deregulation.
Witnesses at the hearings on H.R. 3333 in 1979 noted that the
telephone companies' incentive toward innovation is reduced
where usable older equipment is kept in service." They reason that
new investment is waived when older equipment is still usable.
However, this in no way justifies the marketing of lesser-quality
merchandise to the public. A balance must be struck between the
pursuit of innovation and the conservation of scarce resources.
Continual upgrading to the latest in design, as with automobiles, is
becoming ever less affordable. In time, this profligate consumption
72. Indeed, this may possibly be longer, as the basic telephone design was introduced in
the 1950's. ScixiffFic AMERICAN, supra note 5, at 60.
72.1 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 167 (1977), 179 (1976).
73. See 26 U.S.C. § 38 (1971).
74. Telephone sets are commonly available for $30.00 and up. Repair costs in the San
Francisco area begin at $15.00 for competitively supplied equipment. Where sets need one
repair within five years the temptation may be to forego the repair and invest in a new
replacement. While reasonable from an individual's point of view, the result is the abandon-
ment of usable equipment which could be recovered by telephone companies providing
equipment as public utilities. With resource scarcity looming ever larger on the horizon, the
long-term economies of recovery may be much better than the short-term economies used as
gospel by competitive firms.
75. These sets may appear to be substitutes for the first year or so. The field is too new at
this writing to obtain reliable life-expectancy data. However, the tendency is widely known
in other fields.
76. Testimony of Symons, supra note 66, at 45,
77. See also SCIElTIFIC AMERICAN, supra note 5, at 62.
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of resources may itself push costs of equipment, both telephone
and otherwise, out of reach of consumers in lower economic strata,
in itself limiting rather than expanding the use of communications.
The social costs of planned obsolescence-this depletion of natu-
ral resources at home and the exertion of undue influence over re-
source-supplier nations abroad-are as great or greater than the
immediate costs of equipment, telephone or otherwise. These
costs, too, must be addressed in any thorough revision of commu-
nications policy.78
The proposals for Communications Act reform, and the judicial
and FCC decisions which underlie them, attempt a drastic change
in the way in which telephone communication equipment is pro-
duced in the United States. So far, much attention has been paid
to the advantages of increasing competition in the field. But reme-
dies must be found for the stratification of product lines into high-
quality for rental and inferior-quality for consumer purchase. Two
proposals can be offered which seek to retain, under the "competi-
tive" structure envisioned by Congress, the efficiency of the tele-
phone company-dominated equipment rental regime.
First, durability of competitively-supplied equipment can be in-
sured by adding life-expectancy criteria to the technical standards
currently established to assure telephone equipment's electrical
compatibility with the nationwide network. The FCC currently
monitors electrical compatibility,79 and their mandate should ex-
tend to life-expectancy as well. Minimum quality should be as-
sured; competitors should gain their advantage through true inno-
vation and not through the manufacture of less durable products.80
Where the latter occurs the goal of high quality products has been
frustrated.81
78. The Communications Act of 1934 cited as one of its purposes the promotion of the
national defense. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Curtailment of resource dependence serves this
interest by avoiding costly entanglements needed to preserve access to foreign resources.
This policy issue should be addressed in the communications context as well as the others in
which it arises.
79. See the FCC's rules and regulations, 47 C.F.R. pt. 68 (1980).
80. The original basis for conferral of monopoly privileges over telephone systems was to
prevent unnecessary and duplicative production of facilities. See MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Execunet I). Where shorter lived prod-
ucts require frequent replacements, a similar evil of excess arises.
81. Compare the effect of long-distance competition to isolate benefits to certain areas,
part IIIB, infra; the tendency to reduce free television programming quality, part IV, infra;
the isolation of minor political candidates, part V, infra. Contra the intended result: "For
the purpose of making available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,
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A second proposal is to incorporate an equipment recovery
mechanism into "competitive" suppliers' operations which can re-
cycle usable parts of old systems discarded or replaced by their
consumer-owners. Repurchase agreements or other reclamation
systems should be considered by legislators now, before decades of
resource consumption/depletion make recovery an absolute neces-
sity rather than just prudent policy.
A more fundamental problem with the revisions is their failure
to verify the existence of the market upon which they seem to de-
pend, and thus their failure to justify the "competitive" approach.
Differences in the bills' faith in the existence of a working market-
place are minimal, although the revision bills are identified prima-
rily with the Republican side of the House and Senate committees
which heard them," and reflect what was still seen in 1980 as a
"Republican approach." 3 Former Congressman John M. Murphy
(D-N.Y.) observed in hearings on House measure H.R. 3333: "H.R.
3333 makes two erroneous assumptions. One is that with giant
companies like IBM and Xerox waiting in the wings to square off
against AT&T, there will be a robust marketplace for telecommu-
nications services if all doors are opened. The other is that techno-
logical change will bring competition."" Similarly the FCC in its
Second Interim Report on Television Network Program Procure-
ment found that in the television industry, the presence of only a
few, large firms may spur a "live and let live" rather than a com-
petitive posture toward one another. 5 The parallel is apt for the
rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide telecommunications services .... "S. 2827,
supra note 31, § 101.
The trend in the telephone industry may be for telephone companies to stratify their own
lines of equipment, i.e. to have a lower-quality line for sales, retaining the higher-quality
line for rentals. The purpose is of course to remain competitive. R. E. LeBlanc, vice-chair-
man, Continental Telephone Company, noted that "most, if not all, customers will settle for
a lower grade of service (and, implicitly, products) than we in the industry have tradition-
ally provided. And frankly, if we do not provide a choice, our competitors will." Address
delivered at the meeting of the section of Public Utility Law, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 4-6,
1980, American Bar Association. Reprinted in Le Blanc, The Telephone Industry Facing
the 1980s with Business and Capital Competition, PUBLIC UTILITIEs FORTNIGHTLY (1980) at
7.
82. See Mason, Washington 1981: New Faces, Old Problems, TELEPHONE ENGINEER &
MANAGEMENT, January 15, 1981, at 94.
83. Id. Congressman Van Deerlin, a spearhead of deregulation until his defeat in Nov-
ember, 1980, was, however, a Democrat. By 1981 both sides of the aisle seen to have em-
braced the philosophy of the revision bills.
84. Statement of Congressman John M. Murphy (D-NY)(defeated 1980), Hearings on
H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. I pt. 1, at 468.
85. Federal Communications Commission, Second Interim Report on Television Network
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telephone industry. Thus far, mainly the giants of the high-tech-
nology electronics industry have had the desire or ability to ven-
ture into competition with AT&T."a These firms have dealt with
each other in fields other than the manufacture of telephone
equipment; to these firms this will represent merely one more
branch of a diversified operation. The implication is that former
Congressman Murphy's fears will be proven correct.
This potential failure of the "marketplace" to operate as its sup-
porters theorize is the central issue which demands Congressional
attention. A basic shift in strategy is called for. Rather than relying
upon a competitive environment which may not exist, Congress
should attempt to reform and restructure the existing public-util-
ity format of the telephone network so that it serves public needs
and interests rather than its own interests as a private monopoly.
Responsiveness to consumer needs-for quality equipment at
reasonble prices-should be the goal of telephone industry reform.
Achievement of this goal through public rather than private means
should be the focus of ongoing research and hearings in Congress.
Wholesale abandonment of the utility structure of the telecommu-
nications industry, as is attempted by current revision proposals,
seems likely to create new problems while leaving the basic prob-
lem of expanding communication options unresolved.
B. Long-distance telephone service8 7
Advertisements appearing in major newspapers recently prom-
Program Procurement, pt. 2, at 6 (1965).
86. This is true even though there are many distributors. Notable manufacturers are
Stromberg-Carlson, General Telephone & Electronics, International Telephone & Tele-
graph, Radio Corporation of America, Panasonic, Tandy Corporation, and Xerox
Corporation.
87. Telephone service is provided by means of electrical connections from all customers'
residences or business offices within a given geographical area to a central telephone com-
pany office serving that area. Communication between points within that area is called "in-
traexchange" (or simply, "exchange") since such calls are routed from the caller's phone, to
the telephone company office, then to the recipient's phone-the call remaining entirely
within the one geographical exchange area. These are typical local calls. Long distance calls
are called "interexchange" because they follow a path from the caller's phone to the local
telephone company exchange, then over long-distance connections (supplied by AT&T or
possibly now by a competitor) from that exchange (office) to another telephone company
office in the area near the person being called; then from that second exchange to the called
person's phone. Visualize this as a three-step process: from caller to local telephone office;
from that office to a distant office; and from the distant office to the recipient. See MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 367 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(Execunet 1).
The Communications Act revisions deal with interexchange communication only; compe-
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ised consumers a reduction of up to fifty percent of the long-dis-
tance portion of their telephone bills.88 Customers anxious to re-
new contact with long lost relatives and friends a continent away
were especially encouraged. The development of alternative sys-
tems for long-distance telephone calling represents a major change
in the industry, and the Communications Act revision proposals
appropriately devote a significant portion of their attention to this
change."
Alternatives to the Bell System's long distance network are an
outgrowth of the computer industry. The widespread use of com-
puters nationwide has created a need for systems of communica-
tion between computers.9o Both AT&T and several competing
firms, most notably MCI Telecommunications and Southern Pa-
cific Railroad, established networks to provide this long-distance
intercity service. These firms have branched out into the techni-
cally similar service of providing telephone connections for both
residential and business customers, using the same networks em-
ployed for their computer data traffic.9 1 Typically the rates for
telephone service on these networks are drastically lower in the
evening, since computer traffic is generally lighter after business
hours.9 2 The computer communications companies are thus able to
earn revenues using their facilities throughout a large portion of
the day from this combination of computer and telephone traffic.
titive firms are providing linkages between telephone company offices in various cities. No
competitive firm has yet decided to provide the spider-web-like connections which emanate
from telephone company offices to homes and businesses of any area. This would entail
digging up substantial portions of the urban streets in America. Xerox has, however, re-
ceived FCC permission to provide radio communications to certain individual subscrib-
ers-if their volume of use is high enough-using its "XTEN" system. See S.F. Chronicle,
Jan. 15, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
Linkages being developed by competitive firms are made largely by means of satellite and
microwave, requiring relatively little wiring and construction. Or, firms may lease wires from
the Bell System for this purpose, at reduced "bulk" rates. Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra
note 2, vol. I, pt. 1, at 417-1154.
88. See, e.g., the MCI ads which appeared frequently in the San Francisco area. Southern
Pacific began ads for its "SPRINT" in Summer 1981.
89. See note 37, supra.
90. These began as "private line[s] for the transmission of data, fascimile, control, remote
metering, voice and other communications." MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561
F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(Execunet I). The distinguishing feature of "private lines" was
that they were not providing interexchange telephone service to members of the public, but
were only for specialized uses. Id.
91. See note 87, supra.
92. The Same System that Big Business Uses to Save Millions on Long Distance Bills is
Now Available in Your Home, MCI sales brochure (1980).
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The communications networks of the computer companies tend
to be confined to larger cities, where computers are more likely to
be used." For economic reasons, these services are often not avail-
able to, or from, surburban and rural areas."' Unlike regulated tele-
phone companies, which are required by law to provide some rela-
tively uneconomical service to sparsely populated areas,
competitive communication firms are not so required, and do not
find it profitable to provide service along any but the most lucra-
tive routes. The result is service between large, densely populated
areas only." In this way competitive firms are able to cut costs and
offer great savings to their customers vis-a-vis telephone compa-
nies which face some obligations to serve all areas.'0
As computer-data communications networks developed into po-
tential rivals for AT&T's Long Lines, Bell and the local telephone
companies attempted to maintain their monopoly on the provision
of long-distance telephone service.97 Until recently the FCC had
supported the telephone companies in this effort, and requests by
competitive firms to obtain certain necessary electrical connections
to Bell System equipment were routinely denied.'8 But a 1978
United States Court of Appeals decision cleared the way for com-
petitors to enter this field," and FCC policy has since accepted
93. Author's interview with MCI Sales Staff (October 28, 1980).
94. Id.
95. However, MCI estimates that they will be able to reach 90% of the nation in a few
years. This is often done by means of leasing existing lines from the Bell System rather than
constructing new lines. These lines are themselves priced quite "competitively," perhaps
below cost, allegedly to avoid diversion of customers to firms such as MCI. If that is true,
MCI seized a golden opportunity to catch Bell in a trap of Bell's own making. Private line
users being assessed $21 million, S.F. Examiner, November 11, 1980, § A, at 2, col. 1.
96. Execunet I, supra note 37. Proposals to partially deregulate AT&T may allow that
company to offer private line service to large users. AT&T may focus its own research and
investment on its deregulated services at the expense of its basic regulated service. See
Warner, Communication Deregulation Clears Panel, Wall St. J., July 17, 1981, at 4, col. 2.
97. Execunet I, supra note 37. These firms were confined to offering "private line" ser-
vices. See note 90, supra.
98. MCI proposed to offer its "execunet" intercity telephone service in 1975. The FCC
rejected MCI's proposal, since it was substantially the same service which the telephone
companies provided as a regulated utility. Order no. 75-799, aff'd MCI Telecommunications
Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976).
99. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
FCC and allowed MCI to offer Execunet. Execunet I, supra note 37. The Bell System then
refused to provide MCI with needed electrical connections to telephone company central
offices. See note 87, supra. The FCC agreed with AT&T. Docket No. 78-142. MCI again
appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit and the court ordered AT&T to comply with
Execunet I by providing MCI with its needed connections. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), stay denied, 436 U.S. 915 (1978)(Execunet 11).
470 [Vol. 3
"UPDATING" THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
and encouraged such competition.100 Controversy now centers
around development of an equitable rate structure for long-dis-
tance service both for telephone companies and for their new
competitors.10
Long distance telephone service has historically been more lucra-
tive for the Bell System than has local service. 10 Since public pol-
icy has favored the provision of basic local telephone service at af-
fordable rates to as many persons as possible, a system of subsidy
has developed whereby a portion of long-distance revenue is used
to reduce the costs of basic local service. 03 The approximate re-
duction is reported to be thirty percent; the exact amount, how-
ever, is said to be unknown and difficult to determine.'0
The difficulty of establishing dollar values for telephone subsi-
dies was less troublesome when the service was provided by regu-
lated utility companies, since in many cases the procedure entailed
no more than removing funds from one pocket of the Bell System
and depositing them in another. When independent firms ap-
peared on the scene approximations in subsidy levels proved inad-
equate, and new means of calculation are under study. 05
The Communications Act revisions have consistently devoted at-
tention to this problem of maintaining subsidies in a competitive
environment.' Two payment schemes have evolved: one, for al-
lowing competitive firms access to certain telephone company facil-
ities which their own service requires (the "access charge")'07 and a
second for the maintenance of a reasonable uniformity in nation-
wide long-distance rates (the "surcharge"). 08
Competitive long-distance firms rely upon the regulated service
of local telephone companies to provide connections from individ-
ual customers' telephones to the beginning and end points of the
competitors' own long-distance facilities.'0e Since this connection
represents a cost to the local telephone companies there is wide
100. See An OK for Alternative to Phone Company, supra note 87.
101. Mason, supra note 82, at 99.
102. Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 31, vol. I, pt. 2.
103. Id. See also TELEPHONE ENGINEER & MANAGEMENT, Jan. 15, 1981, at 14.
104. Id.
105. Mason, supra note 82, at 99.
106. See note 37, supra.
107. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 222(c).
108. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 222(e).
109. See note 87, supra.
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agreement that competitive firms should pay for the service.110 The
amount and duration of these "access charges", however, is dis-
puted. Senate Bill 622 proposed that any access payments be tran-
sitional only, to be phased out within six years."' The rationale
seems to be that local telephone service should be weaned of any
subsidy support from long-distance service, and that both services
should be valued independently and exclusively in the market-
place."' Such a policy would be of substantial benefit to businesses
using much long-distance communications. Most residential con-
sumers, whose calling is predominantly local, would face higher
telephone costs.
Senate Bill 2827 recognized that access connections represent a
continuing expense to local telephone companies and thus access
fees should be permanent.' This view facilitates nationwide com-
munications because it allows local service to be priced so as to
insure its availability to those at all economic levels.
In addition to the costs of using local telephone companies' facil-
ities, there are costs associated with maintaining a degree of uni-
formity in long-distance rates throughout the nation.11 4 The tele-
phone companies' actual costs (as opposed to consumer rates) for
calls placed along heavily-utilized routes, for example from one ur-
ban center to another across the continent, are often less than
costs along little-used routes, such as from one rural area farm to
another, though they be only a short distance apart."5 This is due
to an "economy of scale"n"5 which is made even more pronounced
by developments such as satellites, microwaves, and optical
fibers."
110. See the access charge provisions of the various bills, supra note 37.
111. S. 622, supra note 31, § 225(d)(2)(D)(iv).
112. Id. This view is consistent with S. 622's faith in and relianceupon the ability of the
marketplace to properly value such services. S. 622, supra note 31, § 2(a)(2). The dispropor-
tionate impact upon residential users suggests otherwise. This view was not adopted.
113. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 222. See also S. 898, supra note 31, § 222.
114. Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. I, pt. 2, at 1504.
115. Id.
115.1 The large volume of intercity calls requires similarly large facilities. The cost of
each additional call is lower on high-volume routes since little additional equipment is
required.
116. For example, using wires to transmit voice signals, the longer the distance called, the
more wire and equipment required and the higher the cost. But signals broadcast via micro-
wave require no connecting medium so are less cost-sensitive to the distance covered. See
Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. I, pt. 2, at 1504-05; S.F. Chronicle, March 7, 1981,
at 1, col. 1.
472 [Vol. 3
"UPDATING" THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
In pre-competition days, when telephone companies held a mo-
nopoly over long-distance services, these differences in the tele-
phone companies' actual costs were not reflected in rates charged
to consumers since a system of rate averaging was maintained.117
Costs of heavily-used (and less expensive per unit) routes were av-
eraged with costs of lightly-used (and more expensive per unit)
routes. As a result, calls average about 20-35 cents per minute.1 s
While this represents the average charge to the consumer, there is
no reason to assume that any given call will actually cost the tele-
phone company just that amount. This rate structure was
designed to encourage communication nationwide by removing
traffic volume and distance as chief factors determining call
prices.11 9 Calls to remote and distant areas became a feasible as
calls to nearer and metropolitan areas.1191
Competitor MCI Telecommunications' nationwide rates for 1980
averaged about 18 cents per minute, and were only minimally
based on distance or volume.120 The difference in rates between
MCI and Bell is due chiefly to MCI's decision to serve only major
cities, for computer and telephone service alike, while facing no ob-
ligation to serve higher-cost or lower-density areas. 12 1 Communica-
tion to, or from, rural areas on the MCI network is largely unavail-
able." The result is that low-cost urban traffic is diverted to MCI
from the Bell System where it was useful to offset costs on more-
expensive routes by means of Bell's rate averaging. This process
has been termed "creamskimming.""12 Thus it is likely that Bell's
charges on those high-cost routes will be driven up to compensate
for the loss of revenue-the system will become d6averaged, with
distance and volume rather than interconnection becoming the
dominant factors establishing consumer rates. Alternatively, Bell
may be forced to raise all its rates some smaller but uniform
amount to recover the lost revenue. Seeing competition coming
into its own, Bell is currently trying to deregulate its service, al-
117. Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. 1, pt. 2, at 1504-05, 1307.
118. Evening weekday rate; this figure is chosen to facilitate comparison with other com-
panies' rates. Note the higher rate for the first minute and where operator assistance is
required. Pacific Telephone, SAN MATEO COuNTY DiREcaoy 1980.
119. See note 117, supra.
119.1 This is true of interstate calls under FCC jurisdiction only.
120. MCI sales brochure, supra note 98. See MCI tariff no. 1 and AT&T tariff no. 263.
121. Other economies account for some savings, but this is the most significant among
them. Author's Interview with MCI Sales Staff, supra note 93.
122. Id. But see note 95, supra.
123. Compare the "creamskimming" of television programs into pay-TV, part C, infra.
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lowing the abandonment of averaged rates and allowing price com-
petition with MCI and Southern Pacific.12 3 .
Competitive companies and conservative members of the com-
munications subcommittees disliked the concept of rate averaging,
it being departure from market pricing. Early revision bills made
no attempt to salvage rate averaging once competition devel-
oped.1 24 The value of rate averaging in minimizing geographically-
based cost impediments to communication should, however, be rec-
ognized by Congress. Departure from the strict market valuation of
long-distance communication is necessary to insure adequate com-
munications options to all segments of the nation. While there is
some authority proposed for the FCC to average rates,2 it is cur-
rently unclear whether this authority reaches to competitive com-
panies as well as to the Bell System. Elimination of "creamskim-
ming" may require that firms which serve only selected portions of
the nation (e.g. urban-surburban regions only) have their rates av-
eraged with those of the utilities serving rural and urban areas
alike. Of course, such an averaging system would remove the chief
economic advantage of competitive systems.
In any event, the surcharge concept should be developed so that
it recaptures the savings made possible to competitive firms
through their avoidance of the more costly rural areas which the
Bell System serves as a public utility.126 This "savings" represents
123.1. S. 898, supra note 31, expresses no authority for the FCC to average long-distance
rates, except in the instances listed in § 222(h). By qualifying authority to such as is "con-
sistent with other provisions of this act," § 222 seems to leave rate averaging generally to
the discretion of individual carriers. Section 208 prohibits "unjust or unreasonable" price
discrimination regarding localities but some deaveraging would probably be found to be rea-
sonable in a competitive environment, and would no doubt be necessary from an economic
standpoint. It is doubtful that rural or other localities not served by competitive long-
distance firms and unable to receive their substantial cost savings over AT&T rates could
use § 208 to invalidate their own higher, "discriminatory" rates; such power should nonethe-
less exist if competition is to be the watchword of the long-distance component of the tele-
phone industry.
124. In H.R. 3333 the only mechanism whereby redistribution of revenues could occur
was the intraexchange access fees of § 324(b)(2)(B). These fees would cease to exist within
ten years irrespective of the development of competition in the industry. H.R. 3333, supra
note 31, § 324(c)(2).
125. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 251(b). S. 898, supra note 31, § 202(e) is similarly unclear
about the structure of such charges.
126. This type of surcharge would probably exceed what other schemes would recover. As
of this writing intra-exchange connections from subscribers' homes or offices to the begin-
ning and end points of the interexchange networks are provided almost exclusively by the
regulated telephone companies. Certain high-volume users of competitive interexchange fa-
cilities, however, may find it profitable to lease or construct their own intraexchange connec-
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not an award for innovation, that is, for providing a useful service,
but derives from competition with a regulated utility having ser-
vice obligations to customers along all routes irrespective of intrin-
sic profitability. The cost savings and service improvements made
possible through new technological advancements should be dis-
tributed evenly throughout the telephone network and thus
throughout the nation. Confinement of improvements to urban ar-
eas opened up to competition represents an unnecessary departure
from the historic practice which has created what many regard as
the world's best telephone system.1 27 New telecommunications
technology should not serve to stratify telephone service into inex-
pensive intercity and costly rural service. 2 8
It is crucial to keep in mind that the purpose of the telephone
system is to facilitate and to serve as a medium for communica-
tion. As a medium, it should be equally available to all geographic,
demographic, and socioeconomic segments of the nation. Allowing
competition to develop in parts of the telephone system, such as
long distance urban service, actively favors users of those services
(in this case chiefly large business users) at the expense of other
consumers.
Therefore, Congress should refocus its efforts at communications
reform toward making the public utility structure of the present
telephone industry operate more effectively to meet consumer
needs, rather than attempt a wholesale transformation of that sys-
tem. Public control of large monopolies1 29 must be made more,
rather than less, effective.130 The emergence of two, three, or more
tions, bypassing the regulated exchange network along with any accompanying access or
surcharges. Should this become commonplace, through microwave or satellite systems such
as Xerox's (now abandoned) XTEN, the drain away from the public telephone network may
become economically significant. The surcharge concept may have to be adapted to cover
such linkages, or other revenue collection means must be developed. This potential problem
will in all likelihood not become significant for several years, however.
127. Indeed, Congress seems to treat the entire idea of public-utility enterprise as a de-
parture from the norm, even in areas where longstanding experience has demonstrated its
value in terms of interconnection and universal service. Drawbacks in the "competitive"
alternative received only limited attention. See, for example, note 84, supra.
128. Compare the reduction of telephone and data equipment quality, part IIIA, supra;
the loss of television programs from universal to selective distribution, part IV, infra; reduc-
tion of political candidate access to airwaves, part V, infra.
129. See note 86, supra.
130. "Public control" does not refer to stockholder "control" of AT&T; a much broader
and meaningful type of control should be explored. An example of public input was sug-
gested by Symons, supra note 66, at 1199. This area needs careful and thorough study by
Congress.
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long-distance companies to compete with Bell will not accomplish
the desired goal, for two reasons. First, the companies are likely to
assume a live-and-let-live rather than fiercely competitive posture
toward one another once the staying power of each is initially veri-
fied;a0 .1 and second, even if competition remained fierce it would
focus research and development efforts on those portions of the
telephone system where competition exists, such as intercity long
distance service, telephones and data equipment, and directories,
at the expense of those portions of the system which remain mo-
nopolistic and under regulatory control. This trend could seriously
undermine overall comprehensive planning of the telephone net-
work. Congress should attempt to control Bell but not by merely
creating or encouraging the formation of other companies.
A prerequisite to the establishment of effective public control of
the telephone network is to retain existing public utility commis-
sion jurisdiction over telephone services at both state and federal
levels. Some witnesses at the hearings on H.R. 3333 suggested that
the Communications Act should extend federal jurisdiction, pre-
empting state regulations.s MCI Telecommunications, for in-
stance, supports federal preemption since it feels that most state
utilities commisions are unsympathetic to the shift from regulation
to competition. 8 ' Conversely, California Public Utilities Commis-
sion President John Bryson argues that states should retain a role
in matters best handled closed to the people involved."s The prob-
able outcome of this state-versus-federal regulation conflict is un-
certain since the attitudes of the 97th Congress, and the Reagan
Administration regarding expansion of federal power to protect,
rather than control, business interests, have not been unequivo-
cally expressed.13' Senate-approved S. 898, however, contained no
130.1 The "staying power" of competitors is not necessarily assured. Southern Pacific's
SPRINT showed quarterly losses in 1980, caused in part by fraud. See S.F. Examiner, Nov.
5, 1980, § C, at 1, col. 1. They have, however, shown growth. Id. See also text accompanying
notes 82-85, supra, regarding the potential of a live-and-let-live posture among telephone
equipment manufacturers.
131. See note 135, infra.
132. Statement of MCI Telecommunications Corporation, Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra
note 2, vol. I, pt. 1, at 860.
133. Letter to Hon. R.T. Matsui, M.C., from Hon. John E. Bryson, President, California
Public Utilities Commission (July 17, 1980) (File no. 595).
134. The Reagan Administration, and its newly appointed FCC Chairman Mark Fowler,
are philosophically committed to reducing the reach of federal power and to transfering that
power to the states. See, e.g., Wall St. J., July 6, 1981, at 17 col. 4. When the interests of
Administration supporters require an extension, however, rather than reduction, of federal
authority, it is unclear whether ideology or expediency will control. Fowler shows a willing-
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federal preemption provision.'
Joint federal-state regulation was proposed in Senate Bill 2827
and retained in S. 898."' This may represent a wise short-term
compromise, since it entails no dismantling of a regulatory appara-
tus only to restore one later. Preemption at the federal level would
be undesirable in that decision-making authority in Washington
would be isolated from much public input, yet would remain acces-
sible to professional lobbyists. Federal supervision is desirable to
prevent state boards from falling prey to their regulatees, but
whether this danger is of concern to the Reagan Administration
remains to be seen.
Ultimately the goal must be to make the telephone network ac-
countable to those it exists to serve, its customers. That this ac-
countability will not be achieved by establishing two, three, or four
long-distance carriers, each accountable only to itself, should be
readily apparent even in the conservative political climate of to-
day. Therefore, legislation such as Senate Bill 898 should be deci-
sively rejected, and a new study begun, to perfect public operation
and control of the telephone system.
IV.
Broadcast Deregulation:
Two Faces of Scarcity
The Communications Act revisions have proposed a gradual der-
egulation of television"' and a somewhat swifter deregulation of
radio stations. Certain other types of stations, also regulated under
the present Communications Act,"' (e.g., citizens band radio)
would be deregulated completely." 9 Lengthening the license terms
of individual. stations from the longstanding three year period to
five, ten, or more years has been proposed in various deregulation
bills. 40 The 1980 Senate bill proposed five years terms for both
ness to meet industry at least half-way. Id. Reagan Administration views are reflected in
the pre-election volume, THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s (1980), written by many soon-to-
be members of the Administration.
135. See generally, S. 898, supra note 31.
136. See, e.g., S. 2827, supra note 31, §§ 222, 226; S. 898, supra note 31, §§ 222, 226.
137. This could most notably be accomplished through lengthening the duration of sta-
tion licenses for both television and radio. See note 140, infra, for the proposed terms.
138. Current law at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-609 (1976).
139. S. 2827 supra note 31, § 301.
140. H.R. 13015, supra note 31, proposed indefinite terms for radio and five years for
television, § 431; H.R. 3333, supra note 31, had the identical terms, §§ 461(a)(1), 471; S. 611,
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television and radio,"" and the 1981 Senate bill called for indefi-
nite terms for radio while retaining three years for television.1 42
The fiscal 1982 budget negotiations produced interim lengthening
of license terms to seven years for radio and five for television."1 4
To understand both the need for regulation of the airwaves and
the push to deregulate requires an understanding the phenomenon
of airwave "scarcity." Regulation was originally premised upon the
finite number of "channels" available for use within the electro-
magnetic spectrum.14 ' Like any highway, there is a limit to the
number of users who can occupy the spectrum at any one time.
The airwaves were viewed in 1927," in 1934,14 and are still being
viewed" 7 as a public resource, available to individuals but subject
to necessary rules for orderly and efficient use. The public interest
in proper allocation of the airwaves is considered to supercede any
individual user's interest.*48 Private monopolization of the airwaves
was viewed as not in the best interest of the nation." While some
restrictions upon the First Amendment freedom of broadcasters
are implicit in any restrictions upon broadcasting, the Supreme
Court recognized that the goal of broadcast station regulation was
to make the airwaves available to others as well, enhancing rather
than limiting freedom of speech and press. 50 In Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC" Justice White noted for a unanimous"'ex
Court that "as far as the First Amendment is concerned, those who
are licensed [to broadcast] stand no better than those to whom li-
censes are refused."' Thus, public rights in the airwaves were
placed above the private rights of broadcasters. Red Lion was pre-
supra note 31, used an indefinite term license for radio, § 301 (a), and a five year term for
television, § 301(a). S. 2827, supra note 31, called for five year terms for both radio and
television, § 302(a). S. 601, supra note 31, called for five-year terms, § 2.
141. See note 140, supra.
142. S. 270, supra note 31, § 2(a).
143. BROADCASTING, August 3, 1981, at 27.
144. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
145. Radio Act of 1927, supra note 6.
146. Communications Act of 1934, supra note 7.
147. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-609.(1976).
148. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144; L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW at 698 (1978).
149. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra note 8, at 137.
150. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144; Columbia Broadcasting System
v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
151. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144.
151.1 Id. Douglas, J., did not participate. See text accompanying note 254, infra.
152. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144.
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mised on the technological phenomenon of airwave scarcity;158 but
since its decision in 1969, new technologies have been developed
which serve to lessen this scarcity. Several commentators have ar-
gued that this lessening of scarcity renders Red Lion merely stare
decisis, and therefore the regulations upheld therein are no longer
constitutionally permissible. 1 " The Communications Act revision
proposals of the past three years have taken a similar view.' New
television networks are envisioned, able to compete with the "big
three" by using satellite and cable systems, which do not face tech-
nological limitations at present. The possibility of new stations in
the UHF band also exists.156
The suggestion is, therefore, that the open marketplace will
spontaneously encourage the diversity of programming and quality
of content demanded by the viewing public. Close monitoring of
each broadcast license holder by the federal government will there-
fore no longer be necessary.15 7 It is argued that individual license
holders' obligations to serve the public may be lessened. Viewers
themselves will exercise their informed choice and select the pro-
grams they desire.158
There are, however, several major problems with this glowing,
optimistic prediction. Experience indicates that technology has the
potential to open up new channels in some urban markets. Cable
television has expanded viewers' choice of programming, most no-
tably in areas where over-the-air broadcast reception has been at
least minimally adequate.1n However, in areas where broadcast re-
153. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144. NBC, supra note 144, is also
premised upon scarcity of the airwaves; but at a time when technology was vastly more
limited (1943) than it was at the time of Red Lion (1969).
154. See Simmons, The 'Unfairness Doctrine' - Balance and Response over the Air-
waves, 1 Comm/ENT L.J. 1, 43-46 (1977); Bazelon, Regulation of the Telecommunications
Press, 1975 DuKE L. J. 213. However, the United States Supreme Court, per Chief Justice
Burger, cited Red Lion with approval in the Carter-Mondale case, CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at
2129 (1981), decided last term.
155. "H.R. 3333 is premised on the concept that this significant change in the radio in-
dustry, that is the proliferation of radio broadcast stations, is fully capable of providing
diverse programming to listening audiences without Government regulation." Van Deerlin,
Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 1, at 497. Compare: "The Congress finds
that (1) recent advances in technology are making possible diverse telecommunications ser-
vices which are previously unavailable to the public. . . ." S. 622, supra note 31, § 2(a)(1).
156. Up to a maximum of 41 stations in a given area.
157. See Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 1, at 498-500.
158. Id.
159. Bill Mandel, S.F. Examiner television columnist, appearing on San Francisco's
KCBS-AM News Magazine, January 6, 1981. While viewer access to programming has been
expanded somewhat by cable, advertiser access to the new media has expanded enormously.
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ception has been unacceptable, where the technological need for
cable television is greatest, cable companies tend to offer only a
minimal selection of programming,xeo availing themselves of their
unchecked monopoly power.161 The diversity of programming pre-
dicted by deregulation advocates will not arise where "competi-
tive" pressures from over-the-air broadcasting are absent. Yet in
these situations government encouragement of "competition"
would prove difficult; several cable operators' signals would have to
be merged onto a local cable network, with viewers paying for what
they watched on a per-program basis.162 The Communications Act
revisions have failed to address this issue, but its resolution is
clearly prerequisite to reliance on a "competitive" market to pro-
vide for viewer tastes. On the other hand, regulation of cable tele-
vision in the public interest is at least theoretically possible and
should be seriously explored rather than be dismissed as "bureau-
cratic" or unworkable.
Even assuming, arguendo, that cable and other transmission
technologies will eliminate the technological aspect of airwave
"scarcity," there is reason to believe that viewers will not receive
the benefits of quality programming contemplated by Congress.
Thus a new "scarcity" rationale for the Red Lion decision is con-
ceivable-scarcity due to economics rather than physics. However,
licensing'" and fairness16 4 rules retain their potential to expand
communications opportunities to non-broadcaster members of the
public; advanced technology may supplement but will not replace
such rules."
The trend inspired by cable will be to stratify television pro-
gramming onto two levels, a "premium" level on which superior
They appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the new technologies.
160. Mandel, supra note 159.
161. Compare the problem of management of telephone companies in the public interest,
part IIIB, supra.
162. This is a "competitive" solution, but one requiring regulation allowing several cable
operators' access to an area's cable system. Payment would have to be on a per-program
basis if costs were to be kept within reach of the average subscriber; most could not afford
simultaneous monthly subscriptions to competing services. However, per-program billing
raises invasion-of-privacy concerns regarding cable companies' and advertisers' ability to de-
termine the precise viewing habits of each subscriber. This issue is discussed fully by
Wicklein, supra note 19. Compare competitive interexchange telephone service: would cable
operators find all markets attractive or would they be selective? See text part IIIB, supra.
163. See this section, infra.
164. See section V, infra.
165. See generally Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, pt II.
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programming is distributed as pay-TV, and a "free" level which
contains programs inexpensively produced and targeted only to the
widest possible audience.'" Unless viewers are able to subscribe to
several competing services of pay-TV, at substantial expense, their
viewing becomes limited as never before. Programs once available
to all on free television will be diverted, if the economics are
favorable, to a "premium" subscription service.'" The ironic re-
sult is that new technology, hailed by the industry and members of
Congress as the vehicle for a wider variety in programming,' 8 will
become the vehicle to reduce, rather than expand, viewer choice.'"
Congressional recognition that the heralded expansion of program-
ming will be limited to those in the upper economic strata has
been conspicuously absent from the legislative process.
Other problems exist with the marketplace model which sits as
the centerpiece of the Communications Act revisions' approach to
television law. Television has the power to both reflect and create
viewer tastes in programming and in the advertising of products.,7 0
166. Mandel, Pay TV Finally Comes of Age, S.F. Examiner, January 11, 1981, Scene/
Arts, at 1, col. 1. The significant advancement of cable TV may not be "technological" at all
but may consist in making television easily bought and sold to consumers rather than deliv-
ered free. Cable has made television consistent with capitalism but has not done so by ex-
panding media access; indeed, cable has largely restricted access to include only paying
customers, at the expense of viewers of television generally. Looking to cable as the means
of expanding programming may thus be the height of naivet6 and unsuitable as a basis of
statutory reforms.
167. Note expecially the diversion of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) program-
ming to the Rockefeller Center television network in December, 1980. BBC programs previ-
ously appeared on free TV as Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) programming: the Rocke-
feller group plans to place it on pay cable. Mandel, supra note 166.
168. See note 155, supra.
169. Compare reduction in quality of telephone equipment, note 81, supra; the isolation
of technological developments in interexchange telecommunications, text accompanying
note 110, supra; diminution of opportunity for political candidates, part V, infra.
170. Television's power to suggest and induce demand was the basis for the Federal
Trade Commission's study of children's advertising. Congressional response to the study
reveals a strong hostility toward the argument of adverse influence by television upon viewer
choice. The four-year FTC study study found children's advertising to be a "legitimate
cause for public concern." BROADCASTING, Oct. 5, 1981, at 21. However, Congress in 1980
passed what it termed the "Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980," P.L. No.
96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (May 18, 1980), exempting several areas from review by the FTC, in-
cluding children's advertising:
Sec. 11. The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a) is amended by adding
(i) the Commission shall not have any authority to promulgate any rule in the
children's advertising proceeding pending on the date of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvements Act of 1980 or in any substantially similar proceeding on
the basis of a determination by the Commission that such advertising constitutes
an unfair act or practice in or affecting commerce. [Emphasis added.]
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This power to create militates against the ability of viewers to ex-
press their "marketplace" judgments as to which programming is
"best." Rather, viewers often tend to accept what is presented on
the air as being legitimate, quality programming rather than to
question or examine critically. "Unaided" choice in the theoretical
marketplace sense is thus defeated.17 1
Even where several stations appear in an urban free-television
market they do not naturally present a cornucopia of varied pro-
gramming.172 Rather, they tend to outdo one another in presenting
similar, and in the case of radio, virtually identical, programming
which is preferred by the largest single block of station viewers or
listeners. 17 Other programming desires are met, if at all, only once
the primary taste(s) are satisfied redundantly.'7
Given this reaction to the adverse-influence argument regarding children's advertising, sug-
gestions that a similar evil is at work in adult advertising will in all likelihood be met with
even greater hostility.
171. See note 170, supra.
172. Increasing the number of stations serving a community does not guarantee a wider
variety of programming. Often new stations duplicate existing formats rather than serve
new needs. Since station "success" is measured largely by the number of listeners and view-
ers attracted, the temptation is to serve tastes in descending order of popularity. Popular
station formats may be duplicated many times over before less popular formats are served
by even one station. Some tastes are met redundantly before others are met at all. Suppose
young radio listeners' tastes ran as follows (apologies to those offended):
"rock and roll" 35%
"country and western" 35%
"disco" 20%
"classical" 5%
"news" 5%
TOTAL 100%
The optimum use of five radio stations would be for one to cover each of the categories
listed above. All listeners' tastes could be accommodated. Yet at least nine stations would
prefer presenting the top three formats before considering the last two. If the locality could
support twenty stations, there's a good chance all tastes could be addressed. But there is
little justification for requiring four times the number of stations technologically necessary
in order to meet listeners' preferences. Witnesses at the hearings on H.R. 3333 cited the
overabundance of disco radio stations in urban areas in the late 1970's while other listener
tastes in those areas went unmet. See Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 1, at
553-54. Note that stations which choose to serve the smaller markets are not necessarily
financially unviable; they may show profits each year. Id.
The FCC has shown hostility to regulating existing stations' format changes; see note 178,
infra. This may reflect an unwarranted optimism regarding station diversity. A similar opti-
mism that new stations will provide diversity is apparent in the Communications Act
revisions.
173. Id.
174. Id. Where advertisers target certain demographic groups, e.g., women 25 to 49 years
of age, programs must be narrowed further to appeal to those targeted groups.
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Thus, although scarcity of the airwaves may in a technological
sense be lessening with time, at least in the case of television, it
must be recognized that economically-rooted scarcity can have ef-
fects as real and harmful as technological scarcity. Despite the
wishful thinking of some members of the House and Senate com-
mittees, some regulation may be necessary to overcome a natural
reluctance by broadcasters to program any but the most mass-ap-
pealing fare. The often-attacked but only recently-extended three-
year license terms served as a framework to supervise that regula-
tion.'7  Lengthening of license terms is equivalent to lessening of
station supervision.because problems of licensees' performance are
often addressed during the renewal process. 7  While not infallible,
licensing can be an effective means of public control of the public
airwaves.1" Unlike even an ideal marketplace, licensing procedures
are sensitive to non-economic as well as economic concerns, and
this sensitivity can be of crucial importance. 7 8
175. Consider the cases of WNCN and WLBT, discussed at note 178, infra. See also
Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 1, at 500-19.
176. Complaints may be brought to the FCC at any time under current law.
177. This note does not adopt the view that licensing procedures are uniformly effective
or that improvement is not called for. Rather, it suggests that the resources of Congress be
rechanneled towards the goal of improving rather than reducing regulations. See Brennan,
infra, note 234.
178. WNCN was a New York City 24-hour classical music station whose survival was
made possible through the use of the regulatory process once the unaided market failed to
preserve it. WNCN was a unique-format station, and it was profitable; however, as a rock
rather than a classical station, it would have been more so, despite an abundance of rock
stations in the area. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit had required that the FCC give consideration to preservation of unique-format stations
although the FCC preferred to leave such activities to the open market. Citizens Committee
to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(en banc); rev'd FCC v. WNCN Lis-
tening Guild, 67 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981). But in 1981 the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the long-standing policy of the District of Columbia Circuit, and ruled that the FCC
is indeed free to ignore the potential loss of unique types of programming. FCC v. WNCN
Listening Guild, 67 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981). Express Congressional authorization to consider
unique-format-preservation was lacking in WNCN; the FCC had adduced its policy from
generalized preference for the free market. Proposals to include format-preservation author-
ity in the Communications Act revisions were not adopted; although with statutory author-
ity the FCC would probably be allowed to regulate this area.
WLBT-TV was in Jackson, Miss., which in the 1950's and 1960's had an approximately
45% black population. WLBT totally ignored its black audience, and presented exclusively
white-targeted public affairs programming. The station's programs presented only the pro-
segregation viewpoint on the crucial issue of integration. Despite complaints about the sta-
tion's performance the FCC granted the station a license renewal, Lamar Life Broadcasting
Co., 38 FCC 1143 (1965). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and later required Lamar to stop broadcasting altogether, Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (1969). WLBT was
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As part of the license renewal procedure, broadcasters in both
television and radio had the obligation, at least until 1981, to com-
plete a "community needs ascertainment" wherein they would at-
tempt to identify and catalog the significant issues of concern in
their respective communities,*7 9 issues not necessarily translated
into viewer market behavior. In renewal hearings broadcasters
were then required to show how their programming was shaped to
address the identified needs.18 0 The comprehensive House revision
bill, H.R. 3333, proposed to replace ascertainment obligations with
an obligation to "include in their programming the provision of
news, public affairs, and locally-produced programming (including
news and public affairs) throughout the broadcast day . . . ." s
This provision, however, would require no determination of com-
munity needs, and would be enforceable only at renewal time,83
whereas currently the FCC can hear complaints when alleged vio-
lations occur. Ten years later H.R. 3333 allowed for even less re-
course. 83 Radio stations license terms were to be "indefinite" so
examination would be further limited. 8 4 Only a showing strong
enough to warrant license revocation could force even minor ad-
justments in station programming. Later proposals appeared in the
96th Congress taking less extreme views, but a proposal in the 97th
Senate forbids even requirements to provide news and public af-
fairs programming.'
Recent FCC action has, however, rendered the ascertainment
discussion moot with respect to radio stations.'" Radio ascertain-
ment rules were removed by the FCC on January 15, 1981, "since
it was convinced the radio marketplace had become so large that
competition between stations had effectively supplanted the need
for strict federal regulation.'87 This, of course, is the very reasoning
then operated by a non-profit citizens' group. See Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol.
II, pt. 2, at 922-33. Economic criteria would of course have been insufficient to correct the
WLBT situation until the audience overwhelmingly decided to demand responsive
programming.
179. Simmons, supra note 154, at 61-62.
180. Id.
181. H.R. 3333, supra, note 31, § 462(a) and (b); 801(b)(2).
182. Id.
183. H.R. 3333, supra note 31, § 461(b)(1)(B).
184. See note 140, supra.
185. Id. A recent proposal prohibits the FCC from requiring ascertainment, or the provi-
sion of news, public affairs, or local programming. S. 1629, supra note 31, § 3.
186. S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1981, at 6, col. 1. See also S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 27, 1981, at
28, col. 1.
187. Id.
484 [Vol. 3
"UPDATING" THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
underlying H.R. 3333 and later bills. To the extent that commu-
nity needs cannot be met at the level of profitability of other types
of station programming, this reasoning is invalid.' As commenta-
tors have noted, this relative unprofitability is usually the case.189
Given the often-expressed congressional preference for competi-
tion it is difficult to reconcile the attitude represented by H.R.
3333 toward "comparative renewals" of station licenses.190 Under
current FCC practice, applicants for station licenses may be chal-
lenged by other groups who desire to broadcast on (occupy) the
applicant's frequency allocation. An applicant is obligated to show
that it used the station during its previous term to advance com-
munity goals and that it was not utilizing the public airwaves for
its exclusive benefit. If a challenger could show that it could use
the license more effectively than the present holder, it, not the re-
newal applicant, would be entitled to receive the license. 9 ' This
procedure, a thorough form of competition cognizant of non-eco-
nomic as well as marketplace factors, was challenged by broadcast-
ers as granting to "government judges" too much power over sta-
tion owners." Although the power to grant licenses to challengers
was rarely used,198 several Communications Act revision proposals
eliminated the comparative procedure as an option open to the
FCC.' The comparative procedure is, though, clearly of benefit to
188. Professor Simmons noted that "the fundamental reason [for the disincentive to air
public issue programming] is television's economic incentive to appeal to a mass audience, a
common denominator, whose likes and dislikes are measured in Nielsen ratings, not in pub-
lic issue information received." He went on to note that "game shows, situation comedies,
and other entertainment programming draw higher Neilsen ratings than public issue pro-
gramming," a fact which should surprise no one. Simmons, supra note 153, at 55-56.
189. Id. See generally Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 21, vol. II.
190. Professor Firestone of UCLA Law School felt the authors of H.R. 3333 eliminated
the most "competitive" portion of current communications law, the comparative renewal.
Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. 1, pt. 2, at 1158.
191. New station licenses are to be allocated comparatively, Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1944), as are renewals of station licenses, Citizen's Communication
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
192. The Watergate episode brought this consideration to the fore. Chief Judge Bazelon
treats the Nixon manipulations of the FCC in his article, supra note 154. Communications
policy which opens broadcasting to a wide spectrum of viewpoints minimizes the danger of
an administration promoting its views at the expense of others. Present revisions select the
views of the affluent at the expense of the poor, see text accompanying notes 166-77. Thus
Chief Judge Bazelon's concern remains valid, albeit in a different context.
193. WLBT-TV, supra note 178, was the only commercial television station to lose its
license as a result of citizens' group intervention as of the drafting of the Communications
Act revisions. Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 2, at 922-33.
194. S. 622, supra note 31, § 332(c); S. 2827, supra note 31, § 303 (FCC given option to
substitute random selection process); H.R. 3333, supra note 31, § 464; S. 1629, supra note
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consumers in that it keeps broadcasters aware of public needs and
desires and creates an incentive to meet them. The potential of
abuse by regulators is real," but is outweighed by the danger, in
the absence of comparative renewals, of insulating broadcasters
from any measure of performance review by those in the broad-
caster's service area. Where economic forces necessitate challeng-
ing an existing station's license rather than creating new competing
stations (as in often the case in smaller communities where the
number of advertisers is limited) the comparative renewal process
is especially valuable. Given the infrequency of its use, the proce-
dure should be retained as an option should other means of pro-
moting access fail. Senate Bill 2827 proposed this;'" it is a wise
choice for future revisions. Nonetheless, the Reagan-dominated'"-'
FCC endorsed elimination of the procedure.""96.
The comprehensive bill of the 96th House of Representatives
(H.R. 3333) proposed an endowment program to increase funding
of public television."' A trade-off was contemplated: commercial
broadcasters would be removed from obligations to serve the pub-
lic as trustees, but at the same time they would be assessed fees
which would, in turn, support public television.' Public television
would be the vehicle to meet public needs. Commercial television
would be free to follow the dictates of the "marketplace."I"
The inevitable tendency of this type of funding scheme is to iso-
late valuable programming out of the mainstream of television,
onto the relatively few public TV channels. Viewers would have to
consciously select programming with meaningful content; televi-
sion's entertainment function would largely supplant its informa-
tive function. This stratifying of programming into "meaningful"
and "entertaining" categories, to an even greater degree than at
present, is clearly not in the viewers' best interest. Congress should
thoroughly examine the implications of stratification before a simi-
lar funding mechanism is proposed.
31, § 4; S. 601, supra note 31, § 3(k).
195. See Bazelon, supra note 153, regarding abuses of FCC power generally.
196. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 303.
196.1 Reagan has appointed four of the seven FCC Commissioners.
196.2 BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at 24, col. 2.
197. H.R. 3333, supra note 31, tit. VI, §§ 611-45.
198. See, e.g., H.R. 3333, supra note 31, § 414.
199. Statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Informa-
tion, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Department of Com-
merce. Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol II, pt. 2, at 760-63.
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House Bill 3333 did recognize, to its credit, the need to establish
some adequate funding scheme for public television.20 0 The Rea-
gan transition team expressed a desire to eliminate the federal role
in public television financing,2 0 1  and his Administration has
seemed to follow this view. Public broadcasting executives have
predicted that uncertainties in federal funding will spur creation of
"subscription" public broadcasting networks dependent upon their
own memberships for support.2 02 Presumably this involves cable
and satellite program distribution,2 0 3 and represents an instance of
the creamskimming trend noted above.2 04 Coupled with the experi-
mentation of public stations with limited advertising of commer-
cial products,"' this diversion of programming would signal the
end of public television as a non-commercial and easily-accessible
medium. Congressional discussion and analysis of this issue is
needed but may not occur until the Corporation for Public Broad-'
casting, the federal public television funding agency, comes up for
re-appropriation in 1983.205
V.
Broadcast Deregulation:
Fairness and Equal Opportunity under the
Revisions
The fairness and equal opportunities doctrines have been ex-
amined extensively in articles and notes;""' the purpose of this dis-
cussion is to demonstrate the Communications Act revisions' con-
sistent resort to marketplace philosophy as an apparent substitute
for non-economic communications values.07
"The [Federal Communications] Commission has stated em-
phatically that licensees have an obligation to actively and affirma-
200. H.R. 3333, supra note 31, §§ 611-45.
201. S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 23, 1981, at 55, col. 1. The recommendation was made by a com-
mittee of the Reagan transition team.
202. BROADCASTING, Oct. 12, 1981, at 203.
203. Id.
204. See text accompanying note 150, supra.
204.1. See, e.g. BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at 26.
205. S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 23, 1981, supra note 201.
206. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 154; Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness
Doctrines in Broadcasting: Should they be Retained?, 1 COMM/ENT L.J. 65 (1977).
207. Professor Barrow succinctly outlined the fairness doctrine: "Broadcasters have an
affirmative duty to allocate reasonable time to the broadcast of controversial issues of public
importance and to allocate reasonable time to both sides of such issues." Id. at 67 (1977).
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tively encourage the presentation of contrasting viewpoints"Oe in
broadcast programming. Fairness and equal opportunity rules, like
the license term provisions, were initially premised on the limited
number of station outlets.2 09 The revision proposals question fair-
ness and equal opportunity rules on grounds similar to those used
to challenge three-year license terms: technology will provide alter-
native outlets for dissenting or conflicting views so that federal
monitoring is no longer necessary.216 Although revision bills have
not attempted to repeal fairness rules outright, the Reagan FCC is
now lobbying Congress to do just that.210 ' Some bills limited adju-
dication of alleged fairness violations to license-renewal hearings,
often several years away; these hearings themselves were to arise
less often, given longer license terms.2
Most House and Senate revision bills of the past three years fo-
cused on the fairness and equal-opportunity rules as they per-
tained to political candidates. 212 Under these bills broadcasters
were given greater freedom to cover presidential debates without
incurring equal-time obligations. Congressman Van Deerlin re-in-
troduced the debate provisions of H.R. 3333 as a new bill, H.R.
6103, when the former failed to progress through committee. Its
provisions are typical of the revisions' approach to political
debates."*
House Bill 6103, Senate Bill 2827, and the "abolition" proposal
advanced by the FCC"'-' would remove any obligation to include
third party or minority party candidates in presidential debate
208. Simmons, supra note 137, at 6.
209. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144.
210. See Statement of Henry Geller, supra note 199, at 30-43.
210.1 BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at 23.
211. See text accompanying note 140, supra.
212. See, e.g., H.R. 6103; supra note 31; S. 2827, supra note 31, § 304; H.R. 13015, supra
note 31, § 439; H.R. 3333, supra note 31, § 463.
213. Presidential debates seem to have become a permanent feature of the national politi-
cal landscape. The role of third-party and minor candidates in Presidential debates is un-
clear after the 1980 election year; but the Communications Act revisions attempt to define
their role, albeit in roundabout fashion. H.R. 6103 and S. 2827 would incorporate certain
existing policy into statutory law with the result that minor candidates could be perma-
nently excluded from future debates. The front-runners would not need to share the
stage-or refuse to share the stage, as President Carter did in 1980-with dissenting or
minor candidates. Rather, the Democratic and Republican candidates could carve up the
debate empire among themselves as did Kennedy-Nixon in 1960, Carter-Ford in 1976, and
Carter-Reagan in 1980. The result is, of course, stratification of communication opportuni-
ties at the very time when technological developments suggest an expansion of opportunity,
for major and minor candidates alike.
213.1. See note 210.1, supra.
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coverage. Previous FCC decisions had held that the Communica-
tions Act's equal-opportunity provision21 8 -2 required their inclu-
sion. This change legislatively enacts the FCC's latest decision,
holding that no equal-opportunity obligations accrue."" Minority
party candidates are left, under the revision proposals, with only
the option of purchasing air time,"" the equivalent of which major-
ity party candidates receive free of charge by virtue of their pres-
ence in the debate. This discrimination is compounded by the fact
that major candidates are given public funding while minority
party candidates are often on their own, at least until after the
campaign.' This practice undermines the political tradition of
213.2. 47 U.S.C. § 315.
214. Before 1958 the FCC maintained that any appearnce of a political candidate on a
"news" program engenders no right of equal time in opponents. Barrow, supra note 206, at
80; Allen H. Blondy, 14 Rad. Reg. 1199 (1957). But the FCC reversed itself in the 1958 Lar
Daly case. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (Lar Daly), 18 Rad. Reg. 238, recon. denied
26 F.C.C. 715 (1959). Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's appearance on television performing
"official" but politically profitable "duties" during campaign season gave rise to equal time
under the equal opportunities doctrine, currently at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976), for Daley's per-
ennial opponent, Lar Daly.
On the eve of the 1960 election, Congress acted quickly to overrule the Lar Daly result.
Exceptions to the Communications Act's equal-opportunity rule were enacted to cover (1)
bona fide newscasts; (2) bona fide news interviews; (3) bona fide news documentaries; and
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events. Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557
(1959).
But exception (4) was held not to cover debates among candidates. Minor parties were
thus able to claim equal time if they were not included in the debate. Goodwill Station, Inc.,
40 FCC 362 (1962); NBC Co. (Wyckoff), 40 FCC 370 (1962).
But in 1975, again on the eve of a national election, the FCC reversed this position, and
said that debates initiated by others than the broadcaster, and also press conferences,
would not come under the equal opportunities doctrine. They thus became "on-the-spot
coverage of bona fide news events." Petition of the Aspen Institute Program on Communica-
tions and Society and CBS, Inc. for Revision or Clarification of Comm. Rulings under Sec-
tions 315 (a)(2) and 315(a)(4), 55 F.C.C.2d 697, aff'd sub nom. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d
349 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 876 (1976).
The Communications Act revisions (H.R. 6103 and S. 2827) would legislate the result in
Aspen Institute. While the problem of how much time minor party candidates are entitled
to is fiercely debated, and formulas have been offered (see, e.g., Barrow, supra note 190, at
65) the revisions seem to answer this problem by saying, "zero." Discretion is left entirely
with the debate sponsor. This result is unfortunate since it leaves important matters of
public policy and democratic practice in the hands of third parties responsible to no one but
themselves. Communications is thus made not a medium but a sieve exerting a power of
choice properly left with the electorate. See Sanchez and Schwartzmann, "Unequal Oppor-
tunities": Unneeded, Undesirable, and Unfair, 2 Comm/ENT L.J. 623 (1980); Kahn and
Krasnow, The Public Interest in Political Broadcasting: Evaded, Eroded and Eviscerated,
2 CoMm/ENT L.J. 635 (1980); A. SHAPIRO, MEDIA AccEss 50-106 (1976).
215. Purchases must be reasonably available. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
216. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972),
defined "minor" parties as those receiving five to twenty-five percent of the vote of a previ-
ous election; "new" parties may receive matching federal funds after the election if they
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free and open debate which is central to our constitutional system.
The Reagan-dominated FCC has gone much further than cur-
rent deregulation bills in Congress by calling for elimination of the
equal-opportunity requirement217 in its entirety rather than legis-
lating an exception applicable only to presidential debates. 17 .1
The contemplated exclusion of third-party candidates from the
equal-opportunity requirement is intended to encourage debate
among major candidates by making it less costly for networks to
air "exclusive" debates among frontrunners. The exclusion assures
networks' that they need not devote air time to third-party candi-
dates excluded from the debate." This exclusion seems to express
a policy judgment that those successful in the economic market-
place (who can purchase adequate air time) and in the political
mainstream are generally the most meritorious and most deserving
to be heard. But the American political tradition requires that
such decisions be made after a thorough airing of views, not
before, by the voters as individuals rather than by debate sponsors
and television networks. Thus a guaranteed-access, rather than a
guaranteed-exclusion, approach should be required.'
Other fairness doctrine changes of the early bills, chiefly of H.R.
13015, included elimination of the fairness doctrine for radio;22 0
and the modification of the doctrine for TV so that, instead of an
obligation to present contrasting viewpoints on controversial is-
receive five or more percent of the vote. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9002, 9004 (1976). But without ade-
quate capital at the outset minor candidates may never reach the media through which their
ideas become known. Adoption of the debate sections of H.R. 6103 and S. 2827 will
permenently widen the gulf between new and entrenched political parties. Suggestions that
minor parties have been moved forward by means of public financing statutes (as opposed
to the concept, which is valid) are met by noting that it is relative, not absolute, motion
which counts: major parties are moved ahead even further-Contra the ability of technologi-
cal advances to increase media access of all parties, major and minor.
217. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
217.1 BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at 23. The FCC coupled this proposal to eliminate
the equal-opportunity rule with another to eliminate candidates' rights to purchase any air
time to further their candidacies. The FCC called for repeal of the "reasonable access" pro-
vision of the Communications Act, § 312(a)(7), recently upheld by the Supreme Court in the
Carter-Mondale case, CBS v. FCC, 101 S.Ct. 2813 (1981). See BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981,
at 23. Under these FCC proposals broadcaster discretion to allow or deny access for political
candidates would be all but absolute. Partisan, discriminatory censorship by erstwhile "pub-
lic trustees" would be irremediable under these proposals, save by candidates' resort to the
hypothetical "other" broadcaster ever-willing to air dissent.
218. Sanchez and Schwartzmann, supra note 214.
219. See part VI, infra.
220. H.R. 13015, supra note 31, § 434(a) only extended fairness duties, such as they were,
to television; radio was left unregulated by this "replacement" Communications Act.
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sues,"'1 broadcasters would merely treat such issues "in an equita-
ble manner.""' Senate Bill 2827 took a cautious approach by rec-
ommending further study before television deregulation
proceeds," but the 97th Congress may be more sympathetic to
swift deregulation.223 1 The Reagan-dominated FCC has suggested
to Congress the total elimination of the fairness doctrine,"23 2
rather than some form of modification, so some changes can rea-
sonably be expected. Only the extent thereof remains uncertain.
Broadcasters are confident that they will be as alert to public
needs and desires under competition as they are under regulation.
James Gabbert, president of the National Radio Broadcasters As-
sociation, noted that "a broadcast station needs the approval and
attention of the public in order to survive and accordingly must
serve its public in order to secure its attention and approval."2 24 It
is unclear whether the public will feel "unserved" when stations
neglect fairness obligations by choosing to cover public issues in a
one-sided fashion or by not covering local issues at all. One diffi-
culty with assuming that the public will call on broadcasters, via
the marketplace, to present a range of views is that the absence of
an idea or viewpoint from a discussion is not readily apparent;
something may be missing but only its proponent may know what
that something is. The public cannot demand what they do not
know exists. Further, to the extent that radio and television serve
entertainment as well as informational functions, the public may
believe, albeit improperly, that it is better served by the absence of
controversial programming.22 5 Thus, viewer pressure to cover issues
thoroughly and fairly may not arise, and some substi-
tute-probably regulation-will prove necessary to insure ade-
quate coverage.
Fairness regulations are often faulted with encouraging program
"blandness" due to the doctrine's alleged "chilling effect".226 This
effect results from broadcasters' temptation to avoid entirely any
221. See note 207, supra.
222. Which may or may not require presentation of specific views or specific spokesper-
sons, H.R. 13015, supra note 31, § 434(a)(2).
223. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 332.
223.1 See note 143, supra.
223.2 BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at p. 23.
224. Statement of James Gabbert, then-President, National Radio Broadcasters Associa-
tion, Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 1, at 538.
225. Whether correct or not, such is the implication of consumer market behavior. See
note 188, supra.
226. Simmons, supra note 154, at 45-50.
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"controversial" programming which may engender obligations to
provide air time later to an opposing view.22 Doctrine opponents
argue that without the doctrine more controversial programming
may be broadcast. If repeal of the fairness doctrine were to have
such a result it would be welcome by doctrine supporters and op-
ponents alike. Yet whether repeal would stimulate programming
which was balanced as well as controversial, complete as well as
provocative, is doubtful. Elimination of the fairness doctrine would
most likely encourage a proliferation of statements by those most
easily able to make them; but one must wonder whether it would
yield true debate, covering all sides of issues. 22 Deregulation pro-
ponents suggest that creation of new broadcast stations will in-
crease the range of viewpoints on the air; statutes and regulations
should become unnecessary.2 " But this may not come to pass, for
three reasons. First, network and advertiser pressure have been
known to restrict program content and the potential of such pres-
sure casts a "chilling effect" of its own.2 80 Second, free entry onto
the airwaves-into broadcasting's "marketplace"-is limited both
by the remaining physical spectrum limitations and by the huge
capital costs involved in opening a station.2" Third, public affairs
programming, although most important, tends to be among the
least profitable for stations.232 Absent obligations to "devote a rea-
sonable percentage of their programming to controversial issues of
public importance,"2 3 3 it is unlikely that such programming would
exist at a desirable level. Thus, departure from a strictly econom-
ics-based scheme of broadcast "control", that is, control by the
marketplace, is required to achieve the diversity and relevance of
programming required in a rapidly-changing mass society.23 4
227. Id. But whether it is the doctrine or broadcasters' self-interest which causes the chill
is not explained. The better view is that it is self-interest which causes chill. Solutions,
thus, must confront this interest. See text accompanying notes 237-38, infra.
228. Professor Barrow noted the historic bias of much of the broadcast industry toward a
particular partisan viewpoint; no evidence has emerged since he wrote to dispute that fact.
Barrow, supra note 206, at 99-100. With the pursuit of self-interest the intended result of
deregulation, there is room to question the variety of views which may result on the air-
waves without the fairness doctrine.
229. See FCC Frees U.S. Radio from Many Major Rules, supra note 186, for the expecta-
tion generally.
230. See Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 1, at 521-22.
231. Not to mention establishment of a radio or television network. Licenses for stations
in an already-crowded market, New York City, were selling for $17 million at the time of the
hearings on H.R. 3333.
232. Simmons, supra note 188.
233. Simmons, supra note 154, at 1.
234. See generally Hearings on H.R. 3333, vol. II, pts. 1 and 2. The fairness doctrine may
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285The present fairness doctrine's failings are of course legion,
but its principles remain valid and should not be legislated away
by the Communications Act revisions. Replacing the principles of
equality and fairness with standards such as Nielsen ratings would
be a tragic mistake. Yet, following the deregulatory logic of the re-
visions and the FCC proposal to end fairness rules,2 6 a Neilsen-
type standard may replace all non-economic criteria shaping pro-
gramming content.
An alternative solution to the problem of broadcast "chill," one
which addresses broadcaster self-interest, is to incorporate (inter-
nalize) a percentage of air time to be used by broadcasters for pub-
lic-interest or public affairs purposes. Such public-access program-
ming could be produced by the broadcaster, by a network, or by
citizens groups and political candidates. The concept of public ac-
cess is not new, but internalizing time requirements for stations
nationwide has never been seriously attempted. By internalizing
access time obligations the temptation to evade fairness doctrine
obligations via "bland neutrality" would be avoided. Certain
quanitites of time would be dedicated to public affairs use irre-
spective of the content of any particular program or series or pro-
grams. The federal government would be relieved from scrutinizing
programming content with stopwatches to determine compliance
not be adequate. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94 n. 24 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. See note 206, supra, and accompanying text.
236. See BROADCASTING Sept. 21, 1981, at 23. Senator Goldwater, as chairman of the Sen-
ate Communications subcommittee, expressed a desire to "get the federal government as
much out of the hair of radio broadcasters as we can," Radio Deregulation Draws Support,
supra note 170, and since the fairness doctrine is of major concern to the industry, an at-
tempted repeal or modification of the doctrine may be expected. The author in no way
suggests a personal motive on the part of Senator Goldwater to repeal the fairness doctrine,
although the irony is worth noting:
The Red Lion Broadcasting Company is licensed to operate a Pennsylvania radio
station, WGCB. On November 27, 1964, [after Sen. Goldwater's election loss to
President Johnson] WGCB carried a fifteen-minute broadcast by the Reverend
Billy James Hargis as part of a "Christian Crusade" series. A book by Fred J.
Cook entitled "Goldwater-Extremist on the Right" was discussed by Hargis, who
said that Cook had been fired by a newspaper for making false charges against
city officials; that Cook had then worked for a Communist-affiliated publication
(The Nation) . . . ."
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371 (1969). The Red Lion court then
upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, which required that Cook be given an
opportunity to respond.
Reagan-nominated FCC chief Fowler and his colleagues on the Commission asked Con-
gress to do away with the fairness doctrine and equal time rules. See S.F. Chronicle, Sept.
18, 1981, at 1, col. 4. See also BROADCASTING, Sept. 21, 1981, at 23.
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with the fairness doctrine. Whether internalization of access time
be achieved by means of minimum time standards,"3 through
granting of station licenses to private broadcasters for a portion of
the broadcast day with the remainder licensed to access time,* or
by means of some yet-to-be devised mechanism, it would defeat
broadcaster efforts to cut costs via avoidance of fairness obliga-
tions. The goals of the present fairness doctrine would be met in a
more objective, predictable manner.
Since fairness and equal time obligations currently apply to all
television and radio broadcasters, so too should any substitute.
Confinement of public access functions to cable or UHF channels
would isolate such programming out of mainstream broadcasting.
No lessening of important communication on regular radio and tel-
evision channels should be countenanced at this time of expanding
communications options.
Pursuing its own alternative to the fairness and equal-opportuni-
ties doctrines, the House committee which drafted H.R. 3333 pro-
posed "public resource fees" to be paid by licensees2" for the privi-
lege of using the public's airwaves.2 40 But rather than paying cash
to the United States Treasury,"' broadcasters should provide the
resource-air time-which is uniquely theirs to provide.
Each of the fairness regulations has the goal of opening up the
media to communication by those traditionally restricted in access
opportunity. Yet some observers feel that speech is restricted,
rather than enhanced, by means of such rules. The underlying
question is thus the compatibility of regulation with the First
Amendment, the topic of part VI.
VI.
A New Scarcity Rationale?
Both House and Senate revisions of the Communications Act op-
erate on the assumption that broadcast regulation, once justifiable
due to scarcity of the airwaves, may become less justifiable once
237. Professor Simmons proposed a system of minimum standards as an alternative to
the fairness doctrine, supra note 154, at 57.
238. This proposal was put forth by the Committee for Open Media, Hearings on H.R.
3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 2, at 1077.
239. H.R. 3333, supra note 31, § 414.
240. See text accompanying notes 200-05, supra.
241. H.R. 3333, supra note 31, § 414(d)(1).
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technology has operated to reduce that scarcity."" There is, there-
fore, a widespread feeling that the Supreme Court's Red Lion"
decision may be outdated." This note has argued that technology
alone cannot eliminate the effective scarcity of broadcast stations,
for economic factors may operate to limit discussion and debate as
effectively as would the physical limitations of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The question thus arises, would the Supreme Court ex-
tend the rationale of Red Lion to include economically derived
scarcity? Can Congress construct a regulatory scheme premised
upon such scarcity, confident that it would survive judicial review?
The law in this area is unsettled, owing to the court's seemingly
inconsistent treatment of "fairness" legislation regarding the
printed press. In the 1974 case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,245 a Florida right-of-reply statute, similar to the personal
attack rule of the fairness doctrine," was held unconstitutional.
Economically based "scarcity" limited the total number of compet-
ing newspapers in the area, so any redress an attack victim could
receive would have to come via access to the attacking paper. But
the statute requiring such access was held to violate the paper's
freedom of the press.14 ' The fairness doctrine would have required
that access be granted.
The court in Miami Herald made no mention of Red Lion,2 4 8 so
it 'has been left to speculation just how, if at all, the two cases
should be distinguished. Is the crucial difference the source of the
scarcity, technological limitations versus economic limitations? Or
is the key factor the medium being regulated, newspapers versus
broadcasting? Or are neither of these differences determinative?
Are the cases simply inconsistent? Commentators have struggled
to establish rationales;24' the tension between the cases was noted
in the House hearings on H.R. 3333.o While this note will not
242. See text accompanying notes 121-41, supra.
243. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
244. See text accompanying notes 153-158, supra.
245. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
246. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Reg-
ulation of the Mass Media, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1, at 1-12 (1976).
247. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
248. Bollinger, supra note 246, at 1-12; Barrow, supra, note 190, at 73.
249. See Barrow, supra note 206; Bollinger, supra note 246.
250. The following exchange is typical of the conflicts in this area:
MR. LAVERGNE: [a]ny newspaper who wants to can fully exercise his freedom of
the press. He can say: In conscience on behalf of the community I believe so-and-
so should be elected. Radio station owners have to hide that in the harbor of neu-
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attempt to conclusively reconcile the decisions, it will make some
preliminary observations which should guide the Congress in any
future revisions.
First, it has been persuasively argued that the source of airwave
scarcity, technological or economic, should make little constitu-
tional difference. 51 It is the fact of scarcity, not its source, which
impacts upon constitutional rights. Different techniques may be
required to deal with economic as opposed to technological causes
of scarcity, but in each case it is the same set of rights, those "of
the viewers and listeners,"" which is being vindicated. So long as
broadcast regulation has the chance to enhance First Amendment
goals beyond the level provided in the marketplace, regulation will
rest upon valid grounds. 52s' While access to the airwaves is lim-
trality because we are not allowed to do that. And I am just wondering in this
subcommittee meeting whether or not we are members of a free press.
MR. JOHNSON: I think the record should be correct on that. There is no inhibition
on your editorializing.
MR. LAVERGNE: But a newspaper can report the news the same as I do and they
can come in and give an editorial.
MR. JOHNSON: You can, too.
MR. LAVERGNE: No, sir, I cannot, because I have to give equal time and they do
not.
MR. JOHNSON: Well, give the equal time.
MR. LAVERGNE: But except I have some elections that have 20 people running.
MR. JOHNSON: But don't make a flat statement that you cannot editorialize in
support of a candidate when you know you can.
MR. LAVERGNE: Yes, I can, but I cannot do it because I am-
MR. JOHNSON: You can.
Ma. LAVERGNE: No, wait a minute . . . And I am in a system of free enterprise and
I cannot do something . . . the Government is not going to turn around and give
me my money. They are not going to subsidize me . . . .
Hearings on H.R. 3333, supra note 2, vol. II, pt. 1, at 555.
251. Justice Douglas, concurring in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 159 (1973), commented that, "[In practical terms the
newspapers and magazines, like TV and radio, are available only to a select few." Compare
Bollinger, supra note 241:
[Tihe scarcity rationale [articulated in the Red Lion decision does not] explain
why what appears to be a similar phenomenon of natural monopolization within
the newspaper industry does not constitute an equally appropriate occasion for
access regulation. A difference in the cause of the concentration-the exhaustion
of a physical element necessary for communication in broadcasting as contrasted
with the economic constraints on the number of possible competitors in the print
media-would seem far less relevant from a first amendment standpoint than the
fact of concentration itself.
Thus neither the newspapers-versus-broadcasting nor the physics-versus-economics distinc-
tions may be of constitutional magnitude. Policy considerations may thus account for the
difference in treatment.
252. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144, at 390.
252.1 Compare L. Hand, writing for the three-judge trial court in National Broadcasting
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ited-by technology or by economics-existing broadcasters should
remain within the public trustee framework, albeit fulfilling their
responsibilities as outlines in part V above. Broadcaster access to
public airwaves can be conditioned to provide similar access to
others as easily now as at the time of Red Lion.
Exemption of the press from fairness rules must be based either
on the historic role of the press as adverse to the government or, as
commentators have suggested, because there is an advantage in
maintaining both regulated and unregulated media.25 s Two schools
of thought exist here: the "marketplace of ideas" or "public fo-
rum" view, and the "libertarian" or "free market" view. "Public
forum" advocates support the widest practicable discussion of
ideas on the airwaves and feel that neither technology nor econom-
ics should stand as barriers to the airing of ideas. This is in large
part the view espoused in this note. This view questions the ex-
emption of newspapers from fairness rules similar to those for
broadcasting.
On the other hand, the libertarian view fears the hand of govern-
ment upon the media, and opposes regulations on what may be
broadcast or printed. No "fairness" rules should be allowed to
stand, the argument concludes, regardless of how laudatory its
stated goal. Justice Douglas, not one usually to be associated with
reducing individual opportunities for free expression, nonetheless
suggested that the scheme of fairness and equal opportunities
adopted by the FCC would be better replaced with a system al-
lowing broadcasters free reign on the public airwaves." While this
approach would not increase public opportunity for broadcasting,
it may put forth a more honest image of who was in control of the
airwaves.
The current "compromise" view noted above25 5 may represent
the wisest approach for the present time, allowing fairness and
Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1942):
[Plerhaps, if the public interest in whose name this was done were other than the
interest in free speech itself, we should have a problem under the First Amend-
ment. We might have to say whether the interest protected, however vital, could
stand against the constitutional right. But that is not the case. The interests
which the regulations seek to protect are the very interests which the First
Amendment itself protects . . ..
253. See, e.g., Bollinger, supra note 246.
254. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra note
251 (Douglas, J., concurring).
255. See note 253, supra.
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equal time rules for broadcasting while leaving print media unreg-
ulated. The traditional role of newspapers as adverse to the gov-
ernment may best be fulfilled by allowing no regulation, however
innocuous and "fair" one may seem on its face. Broadcasting must
then face some "access" obligations for those unable to reach the
printed media with their views. Broadcasting must be the outlet
for those disfavored by the economic marketplace as newspapers
serve as an outlet for those disfavored by the government.
If Justice Douglas is ultimately proven correct, that no system of
content-neutral access to the airwaves is possible, and that only
dangerous, deceptive look-alikes can emerge from the legislative
system, the time will not be past to remedy the error of having
made the attempt.2"
It should be recognized that this compromise view rests on pub-
lic policy and not constitutional grounds. Any system of access reg-
ulation and fairness must ultimately enhance rather than restrict
communications options for the majority in order to pass constitu-
tional scrutiny, and public interest groups should remain diligent
in making sure such expansion actually results.
The revisions, as noted aboveU 7 assume that an "economic scar-
city" rationale for Red Lion is both invalid and unnecessary. They
are seemingly content with the notion that technological change
can be followed by a changing economic environment, and that
greater communication opportunity will follow. But in the absence
of clear resolution of the Miami Herald - Red Lion conflict, Con-
gress should choose the approach to broadcast regulation most
clearly conforming to the goals of the First Amendment as set out
in Red Lion.'" The rights of viewers and listeners should remain
on an equal level with those of the inevitably small minority who
control the broadcast media."
In this regard a totally economics-based marketplace standard
should be rejected for two reasons. First, it favors views likely to
appeal to the greatest numbers while devaluing minority or alter-
native views. Second, it favors views of those who have access to
256. Similarly, the issue of the fairness doctrine causing broadcast "chill" was left open
for reconsideration at some future date should the issue arise by the Court in Red Lion. Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144, at 393. This invitation to engage in the very
activity of "chill" was apparently not widely accepted.
257. See note 138 and accompanying text, supra.
258. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 144, at 393.
259. See notes 219 and 220, supra, and accompanying text.
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broadcast facilities whether such views are representative of public
opinion or not. Thus, broadcasting would become not a neutral
medium but a selective, content-determinative tool for the inevita-
bly few who control access to the airwaves. The marketplace stan-
dard confers preferred access upon those "successful" in ways
wholly irrelevant to the expression of their ideas. Congress should
not single out those successful in the economic market place or any
other segment of the population for special treatment. Content-
neutral access should be the goal of broadcast regulation.2 0
The major flaw of the Communications Act revisions is their fail-
ure to differentiate between the economic marketplace and what
has unfortunately come to be known as the "marketplace of
ideas."*2  Red Lion made it clear that the First Amendment pro-
tects the latter, not the former." Governmental adoption of crite-
ria regarding which, or whose, ideas merit air time and whose do
not was just the sort of activity and First Amendment was
designed to prevent.
VII.
Conclusion
The Communications Act revision proposals of 1978, 1979, 1980,
and 1981 suffer from a fundamental flaw. They begin from an un-
disputed premise, that technological changes have been widespread
in the telephone and broadcast industries. Furthermore, they cor-
rectly note the potential of these changes to increase these availa-
bility of communication services to the nation.
260. Some examination of content will still be necessary, for example, in determining
whether access was conferred in a blatantly discriminatory fashion. In a facially neutral but
latently discriminatory fashion? Were adequate "reply spokesmen" chosen? (Professor
Simmons explores the reply spokesman problem in current fairness doctrine adjudication,
supra note 153.) But since access is readily and usually conferred the presumption should
be that replies are adequate. This may conform to the heavy burden felt by current fairness
doctrine complainants, but in the suggested scheme, unlike the present, it is appropriate.
The most important advantage comes in removing the disincentive to engage in controver-
sial programming, or to exclude minor candidates for political office from presentations with
the major candidates.
Consideration must also be given to smaller stations for whom this proposal may shift the
chill of controversy to chill of broadcasting per se-that is, to marginal stations for whom
access obligations would be prohibitively expensive. Improper access regulation could nar-
row the market to the most-successful stations, ironically limiting rather than enhancing
communications options as effectively as would the Communications Act revisions.
261. The phrase is said to have originated with Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
262. See text accompanying note 234, supra.
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They proceed, however, to associate this technological change
with a change in the economic circumstances of the industry, a
change which technology alone is powerless to bring about. They
assume that a robust, efficient market will arise for communication
services which will adequately fulfill the public interest as it is de-
fined.2" There is, however, little evidence supporting such an
assumption.
The telephone network has interconnected the entire nation, ru-
ral as well as urban, but not because every link was a winning pro-
position; some areas would have been more economically served at
reduced levels or excluded entirely. Technological change should
not result in the stratification of service levels for the first time,
between rural and urban, or between commercial and residential,
consumers. Rather, improvements should be utilized within the
telephone network to reduce costs and improve reliability system-
wide.
Similarly, the ability to produce more reliable and feature-laden
telephone equipment should not lead to the production of less-reli-
able apparent substitutes for the unquestionably durable equip-
ment used by the telephone companies in past years. Such would
be a betrayal of the very premise of technological progress.
New television transmission offers a similar promise of increased
availability of programs and wider viewer selection. These goals
should not be frustrated for a large segment of the population
through diversion of much of the best of television programming
away from customary channels into "premium" cable television
services beyond their economic "reach." Nor should the possibility
of greater numbers of television and radio stations warrant re-
moval of public trustee obligations of existing stations before those
additional stations materialize and demonstrate a willingness to
voluntarily assume these service obligations.
First Amendment considerations require that listener and viewer
interests be taken into account when shaping standards for regula-
tion of the airwaves. The government must not use the Communi-
cations Act reform process to grant lasting privileges unto existing
licensees while restricting recourse of non-licensees. This would be
263. The House and Senate subcommittees did not explicitly try to define "the public
interest," and many persons would object to having a Congressional committee attempt to
do so; however, they implicitly define it as whatever emerges from the economic market-
place, and given such circuitous reasoning, they can of course never be proven wrong.
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a true abridgment of free speech at precisely the time when techni-
cal knowledge supports the possibility of expanding communica-
tions as never before.
Gradual improvements in the revision proposals were made in
1979264 and 1980** editions, chiefly in their restoration from earlier
bills of some non-market criteria,2" and in a less-than-wholesale
adoption of decontrol." Efforts in the 97th Congress and at the
FCC should be refocused to concentrate on achievement of the
public-interest goals of the 1934 Communications Act, rather than
establishing a monolithic criterion of "economic success." This re-
alignment of goals may not prove easy, but it is crucial if commu-
nications technology is to be made available to all the people of the
United States.
264. For example, in retention of comparative renewals and the fairness doctrine, See S.
611, supra note 31, H§ 301(g), 302(i)(comparative renewal option).
265. S. 2827, supra note 31, restored the public interest goals of the Communications Act
of 1934, § 201 (a)(1); it retained fixed license terms for radio stations, § 302(a); it retained
the option of comparative renewals (conferring the option of random selection, § 303(i));
and adopted the prior review before further deregulation, § 307.
266. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 201(a)(1); see also S. 898, supra note 31, §§ 104(a)(1),
(a)(2), and (a)(11).
267. S. 2827, supra note 31, § 307: see also S. 898, supra note 31, §§ 104(a)(3) and (a)(11).
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